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THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK
Jeremy McClane†

Transactional lawyers working in corporate finance commonly assume that good teamwork results in better deals.
While this may be true, teamwork can also magnify agency
costs between issuing companies and the lawyers that serve
them. This occurs for at least two reasons. First, teamwork,
as it is frequently executed, can discourage dissent by team
members even though well-handled disagreement is necessary for optimal outcomes. Second, since all members of the
deal team ostensibly serve the issuing company, team cohesion can mask the subtle but significant ways in which the
interests of the lawyers and the underwriters diverge from
those of the issuers. Whether teamwork’s benefits generally
outweigh its costs in capital markets deals is a question with
no obvious a priori answer.
This Article presents a theoretical and empirical analysis
of agency costs in team dealmaking, using initial public offering (“IPO”) transactions as a case study. The Article finds
support for concluding that the tension between a lawyer’s
dual role as agent and team member carries little-noticed but
significant costs that often offset some of the benefits that
come from familiarity between parties in a deal. Drawing on
interviews with practitioners and analyzing a unique dataset
of 2,265 initial public offering deals, I investigate the potential
negative impact of team dynamics in capital markets deals by
looking at collaboration between lawyers on both sides of
each deal and the investment banks that frequently take companies public. The analysis reveals that while familiarity between the lawyers and bankers in a deal may promote
teamwork and lead to faster deal completion times, it is also
associated with systematically negative consequences for the
issuing companies, such as higher levels of underpricing and
a greater likelihood of securities litigation. I analyze the implications of these findings for the law of fiduciary duty, the rules
† Associate Professor of Law and Cornelius J. Scanlon Research Scholar,
University of Connecticut School of Law. I am grateful for helpful advice, comments, and critiques from Robert Bartlett III, Miguel de Figueredo, Tim Fisher, Jill
Fisch, Jonah Gelbach, James Kwak, Brendan Maher, Patricia McCoy, Jay Ritter,
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governing lawyers’ ethics, and the norms by which securities
deals are executed.
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INTRODUCTION
The lawyer is the archetypal agent.1 But to stop at agency
would tell only half the story. In many transactional situa1
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(describing the lawyer’s duties: “A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a
representative of clients”). Where the lawyer’s duties conflict, the lawyer has an
“obligation zealously to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests, within
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tions, such as when companies first issue securities into the
capital markets,2 the lawyer-as-agent becomes the lawyer-asteam-member, collaborating with all the parties involved in the
deal: the investment bank underwriters, the issuing company’s
management, and the lawyers on the other side. The ostensible goal of this collaboration is to get the best deal for the
issuing company, which is the ultimate client of the lawyers
and bankers alike. In this context, teamwork overshadows the
lawyer’s traditional advocacy role as parties on all sides of the
table pursue a common goal.3
Transactional lawyers understand the importance of teamwork and few would dispute that it facilitates deal making.4
More surprising perhaps is that even when it is well executed,
teamwork can undermine the very deals its members work together to complete. This is so because teamwork can both
exacerbate and conceal conflicts between the interests of
agents (the lawyers and investment bankers) and their clients
(the issuing companies).5 While teamwork may improve effithe bounds of the law . . . .” Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 550 (1994) (surveying the standards governing legal
practice and concluding that “[t]raditional norms of professional conduct are insistently client-centered”).
2
For the sake of simplicity, I use the general terms “capital markets” and
“capital markets deals” to refer to transactions that result in a company’s issuance of debt or equity securities.
3
By “teamwork,” I mean a group production process in which the work of all
members of the group is essential to completing the goal. See Armen A. Alchian &
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777–80 (1972) (defining team production as “production in
which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of
separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all resources used
in team production belong to one person”).
4
For instance, it is common for law firms to promote their reputations for
teamwork in recruiting and marketing materials. See, e.g., Emerging Companies,
COOLEY LLP, http://www.cooley.com/emergingcompanies (last visited Apr. 6,
2016) [http://perma.cc/X69E-ACM6] (“Clients who partner with us get the advantage of extensive experience, true teamwork and an entrepreneurial culture . . . .”); Mergers and Acquisitions, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, http://www
.sullcrom.com/Mergers—Acquisitions-Practices (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) [http:/
/perma.cc/LLX5-4YS6] (“Teamwork is a hallmark of S&C. Lawyers from multiple
disciplines and offices within the Firm work with each other and with the client,
as well as with investment bankers, accountants, proxy solicitors and other advisers. This close collaboration with clients and colleagues gives the M&A team great
versatility. The Group can execute any type of transaction, in any industry,
economic climate or geographic region.”).
5
See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the
Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7, 10–18 (1983) (explaining the principal-agency problem and advancing an approach to it). For a review of the sources
of agency costs both generally and among lawyers, see George M. Cohen, When
Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 279

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 5

THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK

30-JUN-16

15:55

1233

ciency and yield better results in a transaction, the group’s
pursuit of a common goal can blur the boundaries of a lawyer’s
agency role and create confusion as to whether the lawyers
should pay deference to the issuer or the underwriter—a confusion that is intensified when the lawyers have an incentive to
ingratiate themselves with the investment banks who are repeat players in the IPO market. At the same time, teamwork
can make such conflicts difficult to deal with because parties
either fail to recognize them or refrain from raising objections
for fear of damaging the collaborative ethos. Over time, team
members’ desire for cohesion and aversion to disagreement
may also lead to groupthink, thus making it more difficult for
lawyers to perceive how their clients’ interests diverge from the
goals that the group is pursuing. In short, teamwork may paradoxically be both the key to a successful deal and a threat to
the lawyer’s effectiveness as an advocate.
This Article provides theory and evidence of the conflict
between agency and teamwork in capital markets deals, which
comprise a large proportion of the work done by transactional
lawyers.6 The analysis builds on earlier research on familiarity
between repeat players in IPOs, expanding it to the question of
whether teamwork has any measurable benefits or drawbacks
in the context of capital markets transactions, the collaborative
character of which differs from the more adversarial litigation
or M&A realms. To explore that question, I draw on interviews
with practitioners as well as statistical analysis of a unique
dataset collected from 2,265 initial public offerings of company
stock (“IPOs”) conducted between 1996 and 2010. The dataset
catalogues information on the banks, law firms, and the individual lawyers involved in the deals, as well as stock performance data, company financial data, disclosure from each
prospectus, and litigation statistics, among other items.

(1998) (“In all principal-agent relationships, there is a divergence of interests . . . .
Because the agent does not reap the full reward from his efforts on the principal’s
behalf, and because the agent knows more than the principal about what the
agent is doing (what economists refer to as ‘asymmetric information’), the agent
has the incentive and opportunity to act—whether alone or in concert with
others—in numerous ways that harm the principal’s interests.”). See also ROBERT
H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING
TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 252 (2000) [hereinafter BEYOND WINNING]
(discussing sources of agency costs in negotiations).
6
See, e.g., Dealogic - ECM Statshot, DEALOGIC http://www.dealogic.com/
media/market-insights/ecm-statshot/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) [http://perma
.cc/RDW6-PSMB] (depicting a table of equity capital markets volume by world
region).
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As the analysis below demonstrates, evidence of significant
agency costs between issuing companies and their legal counsel is especially pronounced just when the conditions for team
cohesion are at their best. Although collaboration and teamwork cannot be directly observed ex post in the data, a reasonable proxy is the repeated interaction between the parties
involved in the deal: the investment bank underwriters, the
issuing company’s management, and the lawyers for each side.
I analyze the interactions between the law firms and underwriters at the organizational level and then, using names of counsel
drawn from SEC filings, I analyze the repeated interactions at
the level of individual lawyers. The analysis reveals two broad
conclusions: (1) that repeated interaction between lawyers and
the investment banks is linked to some benefits one would
expect to find with better teamwork from repeated collaboration on the same kind of task; and (2) that repeated interaction
is also linked to evidence of significant agency costs between
the issuer, its counsel, and its underwriters.
And even though their role is rarely recognized, such
agency costs contribute regularly to problems that make headlines in the financial press. An illustration is the decade-long
litigation over the 1999 IPO of the online toy retailer eToys.7 A
few years after going public, eToys sued its lead underwriter,
Goldman Sachs, alleging that the investment bank had intentionally underpriced the deal by selling eToys’ stock cheaply to
Goldman’s favored clients while leaving eToys with too little
capital to survive.8
While many observers of the case focused on the role that
the investment bankers played in eToys’ poor outcome, few
mentioned the part played by the lawyers charged with safeguarding eToys’ interests. The lawyers may have played a
larger role than many assumed. When eToys launched its IPO
in May 1999, it was the second IPO deal in two years that
Goldman Sachs had led with the equity capital markets team of
its counsel, the law firm of Gunderson, Dettmer, Stough, Villeneuve, Franklin & Hachigian, LLP.9 By contrast, the firm
representing eToys—the Venture Law Group (“VLG”)—had
7
See Tom Hals, Goldman Sachs Finally Ends Litigation Over 1999 eToys IPO,
REUTERS (Sept. 19, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/
19/us-goldmansachs-etoys-settlement-idUSBRE98I0VL20130919 [http://perma
.cc/A9BW-F8FQ].
8
See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 601805/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003).
9
This information comes from the data collected by the author. See IPO
Dataset (on file with author).
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worked with Goldman on five IPOs in the preceding year, each
time as Goldman’s own counsel.10 In fact, at the time of the
eToys IPO, VLG was simultaneously representing Goldman in
connection with a different company’s IPO. Meanwhile, both
sets of counsel had faced each other in four other IPOs during
the preceding year.11
The familiarity amongst the lawyers and bankers in the
eToys IPO was not unusual, and likely caused the deal to run
more smoothly. At the same time, one could worry that the
routinized processes and sense of affiliation from repeated interaction that make teamwork successful might have undermined VLG’s ability to recognize and defend eToys’ best
interests. That worry would be especially high if the lawyers
were also concerned (consciously or not) about maintaining the
ability to collaborate with the underwriter or opposing law firm,
whom they expect to meet in future deals.
Agency costs in the context of transactional teamwork have
received little attention in the legal literature;12 nor have they
10

See id.
See id.
12
Scholarship in the past several decades has advanced the idea that cooperation among lawyers would be beneficial to both clients and society as a whole,
and research has focused on finding ways to foster it among legal professionals.
See, e.g., Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents
Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 335–40
(1997) (examining experimentally the impact of lawyer reputational concerns in
improving cooperation); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974);
Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 1, at 550 (considering three levels of institutional
reform proposals to help facilitate cooperation between lawyers and their clients);
Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 235, 248–49 (1993) (exploring
improved collaboration in overcoming negotiation barriers). Galanter describes
repeat litigants (engaged in multiple similar litigations over a certain time period)
with systemic goals as distinguished from one-time litigants with more self-regarding goals. See generally Galanter, supra note 12. Gallanter argues that
repeat players have a structural advantage due to better “information, [the] ability
to surmount cost barriers, and [the] skill to navigate restrictive procedural requirements.” Id. at 119.
The type of cooperation that these studies deal with is distinct from teamwork, as it is described in this Article. Cooperation, as used in other research,
refers to the lawyers on opposite sides of litigation revealing information and
working to come to a swift resolution for their clients. See, e.g., Gilson &
Mnookin, supra note 1, at 550 (referring to the relationship between lawyers as
“critical”). Teamwork includes cooperation but goes beyond it, encompassing the
working relationships between all parties, including the lawyers, clients, and
other outside experts, largely subsuming adversarialism in pursuit of a common
goal. One article that obliquely discusses teamwork is Manuel A. Utset, Producing
Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production Costs, and the Producing Lawyer,
74 OR. L. REV. 275 (1995). The essay outlines a production theory of IPO transactions, comparing lawyers to a machine serving to reduce production costs. In
11

R

R

R
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been widely addressed in the realm of financial economics.13
In this Article, I examine teamwork’s potential agency problems
by exploiting quasi-random variation in the identities of the
lead underwriters and the counsel representing issuers. I start
from the observation that lawyers and investment bankers who
perform equity capital markets deals frequently come across
the same players in a given industry, geographic region, and
time period. While the pool of repeat players is relatively small,
it is nonetheless large enough to accommodate a great deal of
variation among the sets of lawyers and bankers on any particular transaction. Underwriting banks and issuing companies
typically do not pick each other’s lawyers in IPOs, and once
industry, geography, time period, and the influence of venture
capital are controlled for, the variation in the makeup of deal
teams can be treated as though random with respect to the
deal-related outcomes of interest.14 I use this method to compare transactions in which the parties have worked frequently
together in a deal team in a short timespan (an important ingredient and determinant of teamwork15) and transactions in
which parties are less familiar with each other.16 Specifically, I
examine repeated interactions between: the underwriter’s
counsel and the underwriter; the issuer’s counsel and the underwriter (the party on the other side of the table); the issuer’s
counsel and the underwriter when issuer’s counsel has redoing so, the essay describes lawyers as part of a deal team, although it does not
undertake an empirical study or make theoretical predictions. Another fascinating set of findings outside of the finance setting, but consistent with the research
herein, can be found in Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Incentive Contracts
for Teams: Experimental Evidence, 119 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 496, 496–511
(2015).
13
See generally 1 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 270–81 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
FINANCE] (reviewing the voluminous empirical finance literature on capital
markets).
14
I note that in IPOs of companies that have venture capital backing, the
venture capital investors may have an influence over the choice of law firms.
However, the results of the analysis are the same for both VC-backed and nonVC-backed deals. The results similarly survive adding controls for the presence of
VC backing, indicating that this factor in counsel selection is not important to the
result. See infra Part III.B.
15
See Steve W.J. Kozlowski & Daniel R. Ilgen, Enhancing the Effectiveness of
Work Groups and Teams, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 77, 81 (2006). (“[R]epeated
interactions among individuals that constitute processes tend to regularize, such
that shared structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent process
interactions. Process begets structure, which in turn guides process.”).
16
I recognize that, at first blush, this description of the empirical approach
raises obvious concerns about selection. I address selection using a number of
strategies designed to rule it out. See infra Part III.B.2.
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cently served as the underwriter’s counsel in an IPO; and issuer’s counsel and underwriter’s counsel.
The results are striking for their contrasts. For example,
an important pattern emerges with respect to the opening day
price performance of an issuing company’s stock revealing positive and negative implications. Opening day price performance, often referred to as the “bounce,” is considered to be
essential to a successful deal, and underwriters often underprice a deal by 15% of what they believe the fully distributed
trading value will be to encourage a bounce.17 However, an
excessively high bounce is detrimental to the issuing company,
because it means the company sold the stock at too low a price
(i.e., underpriced) and could have captured more of the value
out of the deal.18 When the underwriter’s counsel has represented an underwriter repeatedly within the past year, the
first-day bounce of the security they create increases by 3–5%
on average for each interaction, when controlling for other factors that might have an impact on first-day performance. This
can be interpreted as a relatively modest indication of good deal
performance because it indicates stronger demand in the
issuance.
However, where the issuer’s counsel and underwriter have
been on the same deal team frequently in the past year (as was
17
Underwriters frequently attempt to attain a first-day bounce by intentionally underpricing the IPO stock, typically by 10–15% of the stock’s expected equilibrium trading price. See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal
and Economic Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public
Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 589, 650 (2004). The purpose of underpricing is
reported to be ensuring strong demand and attracting publicity to the stock. See
id. at 602–03. For example, sealed documents from the eToys litigation made
public in early 2013 feature a Goldman Sachs pitchbook stating that an IPO
should be priced at a “10–15% discount to the expected fully distributed trading
level . . . [which is its] anticipated ‘seasoned’ trading value 1–3 months after the
offering.” Joe Nocera, eToys vs. Goldman Sachs: The Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/
nocera-goldman-sachs-etoys.html [http://perma.cc/F5CR-QDBC] (publishing
sealed documents from EBC I, Inc., v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 601805/2002
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003)).
18
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 600. Underpricing benefits underwriters by
allowing them to offer extremely high returns to favored investors while losing out
on very little by way of commissions. See id. at 593–94 (“[U]nderwriters may be
able to increase profits above their base compensation by engaging in underpricing. This may seem contradictory since, as noted above, underwriter compensation is a percentage of aggregate offering proceeds, which are maximized by
raising, not lowering, the offering price. However, underpricing creates an additional profit opportunity for underwriters by enabling the practice of spinning.”);
see also Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over
Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 5, 8 (2004) (noting that levels of underpricing above several
percent implies that underwriters are not acting in the interests of issuers).
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the situation in the eToys IPO) the price increase is much
higher: the bounce increases by 9% on average for each past
interaction, controlling for other factors. When the issuer’s
counsel has represented the underwriter in an IPO in the past
year, the bounce is 12–16% higher than average, again holding
other factors constant.19 Although a moderate level of price
jump is to be expected in an IPO, the higher average first-day
jump when the issuer’s counsel has worked repeatedly with the
underwriter is troubling, because it suggests a relationship between the issuer losing money in the deal and the issuer’s
counsel having a more familiar relationship with the underwriter. The underwriter, for its part, is less troubled by money
left on the table. In the eToys case, for example, documents
were produced in court that demonstrated how the money left
on the table was captured by the underwriter’s clients, which
in turn generated future business and favorable relationships,
all at the issuer’s expense.20 In addition to money left on the
table, a troubling pattern emerges when litigation outcomes are
analyzed: when the issuer’s counsel has represented the underwriter in the preceding year, the associated probability that
19
See Appendix Table 1. Note that the results described in this paragraph
are for repeated interactions among firms. When repeated interactions between
individual lawyers are analyzed, the results remain significant and become larger
in magnitude for all four varieties of interaction studied. This indicates that the
observed effect is driven by the interactions between the individuals involved.
20
By way of illustration, one commentator on the eToys IPO observed that:
eToys opened at $78 per share, which meant that Goldman’s clients
were sitting on a profit of $475 million the minute that the stock
started trading on the open market. In most cases, the clients
cashed out—which was smart, because eToys didn’t stay at those
levels for long. But if Goldman got back 40% of those profits in
trading commissions, then it made $190 million in commissions
[from clients], compared to that $11.5 million in fees [from doing the
IPO].
If Goldman had raised the IPO price to $37 per share, then yes
its fee income would have gone up by $10 million, to $21.5 million.
But—assuming the stock would still have opened at $78—its clients’ opening-tick profits would have come down to $336 million,
and Goldman’s 40% share of that would also have come down, to
$135 million. Total income to Goldman? $156.5 million, rather
than $201.5 million. If the IPO price were higher, Goldman’s total
take would have gone down by about $45 million . . . .
If you look at the chart of what happened to the eToys share
price in the first few months after the IPO, the price fluctuated
around $40 a share—which means that by Goldman’s own standards, it really ought to have priced the IPO much closer to $37 than
to $20.
Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, REUTERS BLOGS (Mar. 11,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/03/11/where-banks-reallymake-money-on-ipos/ [http://perma.cc/PHH4-L44V].
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the issuing company will be subject to a securities class action
lawsuit nearly doubles.21
These results, along with those described in more detail in
this Article, provide evidence that while teamwork enhances a
deal, the familiarity and collaboration that go hand-in-hand
with teamwork have the potential to enhance the costs of
agents’ misaligned incentives. Put simply, frequent interaction
is a core component of teamwork, and groups who work together form better teams.22 However, teamwork in a context
where adversarial interests exist23 may pose dangers with respect to the lawyer’s fundamental duties as an agent.
The rest of this Article is organized as follows. Part I provides an overview of the IPO process and the role of the issuer,
the investment banks, and the lawyers for each side. Part II
explains the empirical strategy and develops the hypotheses to
be tested. Part III discusses the quantitative results, their interpretation, and competing possible interpretations. Part IV
provides a discussion of the legal and practical implications of
the results.
I
BACKGROUND: COLLABORATION IN THE IPO PROCESS
This section provides an overview of the process by which
IPO deals typically occur. Generally speaking, the team doing
an IPO works to complete a common set of tasks: gathering
information about the issuing company, creating an offering
document, marketing the issuing company to investors, liaising with the Securities Exchange Commission, and stock
exchanges to ensure that regulatory requirements are met.24
Although all the members of the deal team take part in all of
these tasks, they also take on specialized roles that are impor21
See Appendix Table 4. All specifications include controls for industries,
years, and other confounds. The majority of the results are significant at the 5%,
1%, or 0.1% level using robust standard errors, with a few results significant at
the 10% level using robust standard errors.
22
See J. Richard Hackman, Why Teams Don’t Work, in 4 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL ISSUES: THEORY AND RESEARCH ON SMALL GROUPS, 245,
249–50 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 2002).
23
See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 601805/2002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2003) (describing the interests of the underwriter and issuer in a firm commitment underwriting as “adversarial” in nature and rejecting the assertion that the
underwriter had a fiduciary duty to the issuer with respect to the IPO price
negotiation).
24
See generally Carl W. Schneider, Joseph M. Manko & Robert S. Kant,
Going Public: Practice, Procedure, and Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981)
(describing the tasks performed by bankers, lawyers, and issuing company management when doing an IPO).
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tant to understand for analyzing the team dynamic and the
emergence of agency costs.
A. The Role of Issuers and Underwriters
An IPO begins when a privately held company decides to
issue publicly traded equity.25 A company’s decision to “go
public” frequently turns on the need to raise capital in order to
fund its operations and grow.26 The issuing company selects
an investment bank to act as the managing underwriter to
shepherd the transaction to completion.27 The investment
banks that do IPOs often complete dozens of such transactions
a year, and thus have process expertise in documenting the
deals, liaising with the SEC, coordinating the various parties,
and working out the financial aspects of the offering.28 In addition, they take the lead in marketing the deal to the initial
investors, most of whom are institutional investors such as
mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds with whom the
underwriter has relationships.29
Issuers choose underwriters using one of two general
methods: the issuer can auction the position to the most competitive bidder among a group of banks in a process known as
competitive underwriting, or the issuer can choose an underwriter based on informal negotiations in what is known as negotiated underwriting.30 Competitive underwriting seldom
occurs in the U.S. market except in certain circumstances for
which it is legally mandated.31 For negotiated underwritings,
25
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 585 (“An initial public offering of equity, or
‘IPO,’ is a company’s first sale of shares into the public market.”).
26
There are other reasons a company might go public in addition to the need
for capital. For example, a company may need to create a liquid market for its
stock to use it as a type of employee compensation.
27
Occasionally two managing underwriters will be appointed, often referred
to as joint lead managers or joint bookrunners. See Royce de R. Barondes et al.,
Underwriters’ Counsel as Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law
Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 164, 166 (2007) (describing the process of selecting the underwriter). This happens when the IPO is
expected to be particularly large. There are 826 observations involving joint managers in the dataset, comprising 30.3% of the deals. As explained below, these
observations were weighted to avoid a double-counting effect.
28
See id.
29
See id. at 168.
30
JOHN C. BURCH, JR. & BRUCE S. FOERSTER, CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK 272
(6th ed. 2016) [hereinafter CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK].
31
For instance, underwriters for municipal securities are usually chosen by
auction. The reason for issuers’ overwhelming preference for negotiated underwriting has puzzled commentators. See Yoram Barzel, Michel A. Habib & D.
Bruce Johnsen, IPO Syndicates, Private Foreknowledge, and the Economics of
Excess Search 7 (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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the issuer chooses the lead manager from a number of eligible
banks after a series of meetings, colloquially known as “beauty
contests” or “bake sales,” where each underwriter will showcase their experience and provide an early estimate of the price
at which it will market the issuer’s stock.32 Negotiated underwritings in the U.S. market overwhelmingly involve so-called
firm commitment contracts—contracts that require the underwriter first to purchase all of the issuer’s shares itself,33 then
resell the shares to investors in the market.34 The effect of this
is that the underwriter is liable for any shares that cannot be
sold in the market.35 As compensation, the underwriter takes
a percentage of the total proceeds of the deal. In U.S. deals
completed in recent years, most IPOs have had a gross spread
of 7% of the total amount raised.36
For most deals, underwriters form syndicates with a number of other banks to help distribute the shares and spread the
sales effort, costs, and risk.37 A common syndicate includes
ten to twenty banks, although syndicates of over one hundred
banks are not unheard of.38 Regardless of the syndicate size,
the first underwriter chosen by the issuer becomes the “lead” or
“managing” underwriter and retains control of almost every
aspect of the IPO process.39 The other syndicate members are
32
See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 166 (describing the process of selecting the underwriter). The choice of lead underwriter may also be influenced by
preexisting relationships with an underwriting firm. See CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 272.
33
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 590. Two other types of contracts sometimes
found in U.S. underwritings are best efforts contracts and standby contracts. See
In re Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,371, 21 SEC
Docket 930 (Dec. 12, 1980). Since these contracts are rarely used, this Article
does not focus on them.
34
See In re Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. at *3 (describing firm commitment underwriting).
35
In practice, this is rarely a problem, and most IPOs are oversubscribed.
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 590.
36
See id. at 592; see also Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent
Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 1107–12 (2000) (describing the 7% underwriting discount that persists in most IPOs, particularly those in the $30–120 million range,
and arguing that its persistence is a result of implicit collusion, or strategic
pricing, amongst underwriters).
37
See Yoram Barzel, Michel A. Habib & D. Bruce Johnsen, Prevention Is
Better Than Cure: The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition,
79 J. BUS. 2911, 2911–23 (2006). A number of theories have been advanced to
explain the use of underwriting syndicates. One theory suggests that it is done to
remove the threat of speculation and opportunism by other banks. See id.
38
See Barzel, Habib & Johnsen, supra note 31, at 2929 (describing the trend
toward larger syndicates).
39
It is not unusual for large IPOs to have multiple lead underwriters as well.
In this case, one of the lead underwriters typically maintains control of the transaction, selects counsel, and manages the deal. This underwriter is known as the
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relatively passive apart from their role helping to place their
allocation of shares.40
Once selected, the lead underwriter appoints counsel to
advise it and the rest of the syndicate.41 Due diligence commences shortly thereafter and the issuer, the bankers, and
both sets of counsel begin drafting the offering prospectus—the
document that serves as the primary marketing document for
the IPO.42 This preliminary prospectus (referred to as the red
herring) is filed with the SEC on Form S-1.43 Although the
price of the stock is not set when the preliminary prospectus is
filed, SEC regulations require that it contain a bona fide price
estimate, usually given as a range.44
When the prospectus is filed and while the SEC review is
taking place, the lead underwriter and issuer management
commence a marketing effort, the “road show,” during which
they will meet with investors in different cities and build a book
of indicative orders for the stock based on the information in
the preliminary prospectus.45 The investors to whom the IPO is
marketed are typically large institutional investors. Upon completion of the roadshow, the lead underwriter and the issuing
company’s management agree on a final price for the stock,
largely influenced by the level of investor demand revealed on
“lead left” underwriter due to the fact that its name appears on the leftmost side of
the prospectus cover. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (D) (name withheld
by request) (July 23, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with D]. For
this study, I analyzed the data using the lead left as the underwriter, and using a
method to de-weight observations with multiple underwriters.
40
See Shane A. Corwin & Paul Schultz, The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates: Pricing, Information Production, and Underwriter Competition, 60 J. FIN. 443,
446 (2005) (“These [non-managing syndicate members] do less work than comanagers, but are also relatively cheap to include.”).
41
See CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 232.
42
See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 166–67 (describing the preliminary
stages of the IPO process).
43
See id.; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 100–01, 115 (11th ed. 2012) (describing the process of
drafting the “red herring,” or preliminary prospectus). The preliminary prospectus can be filed on other forms as well: companies under a certain size can file on
Form SB-1, and certain types of companies can file on Form S-3. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 228.501, 229.501 (2016). These are collectively called “S-1” in this Article for
ease of reference.
44
17 C.F.R. §§ 228.501, 229.501. See also Barondes et al., supra note 27, at
166–67.
45
Investors cannot yet make binding orders, but can indicate how much
stock they would purchase, and they typically abide by their indications. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2012); see also COFFEE & SALE,
supra note 43, at 115 (“Sales are . . . still barred . . . and the underwriter also
cannot accept customers’ oral offers to buy. But the underwriters can ‘build their
book,’ collecting non-binding indications of interest from customers, which they
hope to convert into sales once the registration statement is declared effective.”).
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the roadshow, as well as market conditions.46 Setting the final
price is technically a negotiation; however, issuers tend to rely
heavily on their underwriters’ advice in this process.47 When
the final price is agreed upon and the prospectus is approved,
final pricing information will be filed and a final prospectus and
registration statement will be deemed effective by the SEC.48
Once the registration statement becomes effective, the shares
are sold to investors at the final price, thus entering the
market.49
B. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
When a company decides to issue stock to the public, its
management retains counsel to assist in the process if the
company does not already have legal counsel. The issuer’s
counsel will be part of the transaction from the very beginning.50 In many cases, it will assist the issuer after the deal is
concluded in its ongoing reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.51 Underwriter’s counsel is in turn
retained once the underwriter is selected and the syndicate is
formed.52 Although underwriter’s counsel represents the entire syndicate, the lawyers take their instructions almost exclusively from the lead underwriter.53
The issuing company’s choice of counsel is important, because the issuer’s counsel typically takes a leading role in coordinating the parties to the deal, conducting the due diligence,
drafting the prospectus, and resolving legal uncertainties in
connection with the issuance.54 Perhaps most importantly, the
issuer’s lawyers serve as guide and advisor to the issuing com46
See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 168 (“In a customary IPO, there is
not a definitive agreement on the price at which the underwriters will resell the
stock to the public until after the preliminary marketing process is complete . . . .
SEC rules, however, require that a preliminary prospectus for an IPO circulated
prior to the pricing include a bona fide estimate of the price, frequently stated as a
range, at which the stock will be sold. This price estimate may change in subsequent preliminary prospectuses, as the managing underwriter acquires information during the marketing process.” (footnote omitted)).
47
See id.
48
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.424(b), 230.430A (2016); see also COFFEE & SALE,
supra note 43, at 129.
49
See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 129.
50
See id.
51
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012); see also
CAPITAL MARKETS HANDBOOK, supra note 30, at 274.
52
See Interview with D, supra note 39.
53
See id.
54
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 17–19 (discussing the role played by
the issuing company’s counsel when beginning an IPO).
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pany’s management and other personnel involved in the deal,
most of whom will be unfamiliar with the world of capital markets.55 Both through advice and by example, the issuer’s lawyers counsel the issuer’s management on how to deal with the
underwriters on issues related to due diligence, prospectus and
marketing disclosure, and the market norms for IPOs in a given
industry.56
The lawyers for both sides also play an important role in
conducting due diligence and drafting the prospectus.57 The
prospectus is usually drafted with participation of the lawyers,
bankers, and issuing company’s management, typically beginning with a precedent and going through numerous iterations
of drafting, commenting, and revising until the preliminary version to be filed with the SEC is complete.58 The counsel for the
company going public typically takes primary responsibility for
drafting most parts of the prospectus and has a great deal of
influence over the draft.59 However, the underwriter’s counsel
has a great deal of impact as well.60 SEC rules set out the
information to be disclosed61 and also require the inclusion of
55
See id.; see also Telephone Interview with Attorney (W) (name withheld by
request) (Feb. 2, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with W].
56
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 17–19 (“Management cannot properly take a passive role and rely entirely upon counsel to identify the information
to be assembled, verify the information, and prepare the registration statement
properly. Clients may have, quite appropriately, a different expectation of the
lawyer’s role relating to those parts of the prospectus which deal with primarily
‘legal’ matters such as descriptions of litigation, legal proceedings, tax consequences of various transactions, interpretation of contracts, and descriptions of
governmental requirements.”).
57
See id. at 17.
58
See Barondes et al., supra note 27, at 167 (“This drafting is an iterative
process, as knowledge gained in due diligence informs what needs to be said
about the issuer.”)
59
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 14–15 (“The ‘quarterback’ in preparing the registration statement is normally the attorney for the company. Company counsel is principally responsible for preparing the non-financial parts of
the registration statement.” (footnote omitted)).
60
See id. at 16 (“Close cooperation is required among counsel for the company, the underwriters’ counsel, the accountants, and the printer.”).
61
See Regulation S-K, Items 10–915, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–.915 (2016). Required disclosure includes: (1) information about the company’s business, see
Regulation S-K, Items 101–03, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101–.103; (2) the management’s
discussion and analysis of the financial condition of the company, including
future projections if desired, see Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.303;
(3) financial statements and an auditor’s opinion covering them, see Regulation SX, 17 C.F.R. § 210; (4) a description of material contracts, see Regulation S-K,
Items 101-915, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101-.915; (5) information about legal and regulatory problems facing the company, see Regulation S-K, Item 103, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229.103; (6) information about the officers and directors of the company and
their compensation, see Regulation S-K, Items 403-05, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.403-05;
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any information needed to make the disclosure in the prospectus “not misleading.”62 The SEC reviews the preliminary prospectus for conformity with its regulations, although it does not
typically pass judgment on the accuracy of the information it
contains.63
Counsel will also usually be very involved in the negotiation of the underwriting agreement, which is the agreement
that governs the legal relationship between the underwriter
and the issuer.64 The underwriting agreement contains the
terms upon which the underwriter will purchase the shares at
an agreed-upon discount and distribute them to investors and
to other members of the underwriting syndicate, as well as
setting out the advising and marketing services that the underwriter agrees to provide.65
C. Agency and Teamwork in IPOs
The relationships between the parties described in the preceding section differ from the relationships in other legal contexts. Unlike the litigation or M&A contexts in which agents
represent interests that are clearly adverse to one another, in
the IPO context all the parties ultimately serve as agents of the
issuer. The issuer hires the underwriter, and the underwriter’s
counsel works to help the underwriter serve as the issuer’s
agent. The parties whose paths frequently cross understand
that their job is to reach a common goal, and they see their role
as ultimately serving the issuing company.66 This is important
for two reasons. First, it gives rise to the expectation that all
parties will function cooperatively, thus elevating the importance of teamwork.
Second, because all parties purportedly work as agents of
the issuer, but in fact have divergent interests, the principaland certain industry specific information, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Industry Guides, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.801-02.
62
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.408(a) (2016).
63
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 19–22 (discussing the SEC comment
and review process); see also William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW. 65 (1996) (describing the SEC
staff’s role in the registration and disclosure process).
64
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 16–17.
65
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 592.
66
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 19–22 (discussing the importance of
the deal team having a common understanding of their goal for the deal to be
successful); Interview with W, supra note 55.
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agent problem67 is especially sharp but for the parties in the
deal to perceive. The possibility of a principal-agency problem
(or the agency costs problem) arises whenever agents are hired
to perform “imperfectly observable discretionary actions that
affect the welfare of the principal.”68 Because the principal
does not have the skill to perform the task itself or to monitor
the performance of the agent, the agent may take actions for its
own benefit at the expense of the issuer.69 To be sure, agency
costs arise whether or not parties collaborate or perform tasks
in a group. However, conditions like familiarity and cohesion
that make groups work well together can also undermine an
agent’s incentives to serve a principal in both overt and subtle
ways. For instance, in the IPO context, lawyers for the issuer
may think they are serving their client by showing solicitude to
their counterparts and helping a deal to go smoothly, when in
reality it would be more in their client’s interests if the lawyers
pushed harder to secure better terms for the issuer. More subtly, but no less importantly, members of the issuing company’s
management frequently have no experience in capital markets
and look to their lawyers to guide them through the unfamiliar
terrain, explain what is “normal” or “market standard,” and
demonstrate how to interact with other parties to the deal.70 If
the issuer’s lawyers are deferential to their colleagues in the
banks or side with the banks whenever the issuer’s management raises an objection to something that everyone else takes
for granted as part of the typical deal, the lawyers might inadvertently downplay the extent to which the incentives of the
banks and issuers diverge, at least on certain issues. When
everyone on the deal team believes they are working toward the
same goal—which is nominally to serve the issuer—it may be
difficult to recognize the ways in which the team is not serving
the issuer well. The team-like structure of an IPO makes it
more difficult for the issuer and its counsel to perceive where
its interests diverge from those of the underwriter, who appears
to be serving the issuer’s interests as part of the team.
Moreover, teamwork can diminish counsel’s ability and incentive to monitor the underwriter on behalf of the issuer.
Counsel’s ability to monitor can be compromised if counsel
foresees working for the underwriter again in the future and if
67

See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHIFOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 198–200 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller
eds., 2014).
68
See id. at 198.
69
Id. at 198–99.
70
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 17–19.
CAL
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the consequences of failing to monitor seem small because the
underwriter’s goals are purportedly in line with the issuer’s.71
The better the team dynamic among the repeat players in a
deal, the more likely it is that those same players will have less
incentive to monitor. The key question is whether or not the
benefits of teamwork trump any possible agency costs that
come with it.
II
HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Drawing from the literature on social psychology as well as
empirical finance, I explore here hypotheses about the outcomes of IPOs that can be used to assess the impact of collaboration on lawyers’ agency. By design, detailed accounts of the
meetings and telephone calls involved in a deal are usually not
kept or made available to the public. Therefore, the analysis of
collaboration and team dynamics is necessarily indirect. Nonetheless, the indirect evidence provides insights into some of the
dynamics at work in a deal.
Methodologically, the research described below occurred
using the following steps. First, I spoke with practitioners from
investment banks and law firms that represent issuers and
underwriters to find out what impact they thought teamwork
has, both positive and negative.72 I then looked at the literature on collaboration and teamwork to fit the practitioners’
insights into a theoretical framework and formulate general
hypotheses. I also looked at the empirical corporate finance
literature to determine what sort of quantitative analysis has
been done, what sort of data can be analyzed that could provide
insight into the general hypotheses, and what kind of results
could be expected to support or refute the hypotheses.73 Finally, after gathering and analyzing the data, I again interviewed practitioners to help further illuminate the results.
The methodology employed for this research undoubtedly
has limitations. First, there is a relatively narrow set of IPO
outcomes that can be measured quantitatively, and they may
only tell part of the story with regard to collaboration or repeated interaction. Second, despite robust efforts to eliminate
71

See Interview with W, supra note 55.
As previously noted, this Article builds on earlier work on familiarity
among underwriters and their lawyers. This methodology arose in part from that
research.
73
This component of the work builds upon research previously published by
the author, finding an effect from repeated interaction in dealmaking.
72
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errors in the interpretation of the results, such errors may
exist. Third, interviews with practitioners may be subject to
cognitive bias or selective memory, despite efforts to ask questions openly and in a way that would not lead interviewees to
any particular answers.
Nonetheless, even given the inherent limitations of the research method, the results and the analysis below are compelling. The many various quantitative tests, when considered
together, reveal a consistent story that fits well with the practitioner accounts and the theoretical literature. In addition, the
statistical results are robust, and withstand numerous tests
for bias, as well as tests to assess whether alternative interpretations would be more appropriate. The hypotheses tested, the
results, and the various checks are further described below.
A. Hypotheses on Team Dynamics and IPO Deal
Outcomes
The empirical and psychological research on teams suggests that team members’ familiarity from working together
repeatedly is a critical component of teamwork.74 A group’s
repeated performance of a collective task is commonly assumed
to have positive benefits for the group’s ability to repeat that
task successfully. However, the literature on teamwork provides a mixed picture on the impact of group repetition on
performance, highlighting upsides as well as potential
problems.75
1. Positive Effects of Repeated Interaction
To the extent that it is helpful, repeated activity among
members of a team or group improves team dynamics by helping to build relationships amongst those working together recurrently.76 The literature describes members’ repeated
interactions in pursuit of common goals to be essential inputs
to, and hallmarks of, a successful team, as measured by factors such as the speed and efficiency with which a group com74
See Hackman, supra note 22, at 250 (citing NTSB statistics that 73% of
commercial aviation accidents in its database occurred on a crew’s first day flying
together, and 44% of those accidents happened on the crew’s very first flight; and
highlighting findings that airline crews and teams of doctors who have worked
together in the past perform significantly better, even when fatigued, than do
rested crews who have not worked together before).
75
Id. at 245–56.
76
See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 81; see also Interview with D,
supra note 39; Interview with W, supra note 55.
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pletes a task and the quality of the output.77 These benefits
accrue for several reasons. Most relevantly, groups benefit
from repeating complex tasks together because such activity
facilitates a shared understanding of the goals of those tasks,
what roles each group member will take on, and how people in
each role will leverage their particular skill or expertise.78 The
literature explains that repeated interaction allows some
processes to become routinized, so that each member of the
team can leverage his or her expertise more effectively on tasks
that cannot be routinized.79
Repeated interactions also help to create common norms of
communication and behavior, including a common language
for discussing the activity, and a common set of mental models
for performing a task.80 Perhaps most importantly, familiarity
establishes trust among the team’s members that does not
exist in the same sense that it does for non-group members.
The benefits of repeated interaction accrue most strongly when
group membership remains consistent from task to task: experimental studies suggest that when team members have
worked together repeatedly, replacing one team member with a
new person results in a loss of some of these gains from repeated interaction as the new member adjusts to an unfamiliar
group dynamic.81
77
See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 77 (reviewing and providing a
meta-analysis of fifty years of psychological research on teams). According to this
literature, teams become cohesive as “task cycles . . . ’entrain’ the team to task
dynamics by making specific, iterative, and repeated demands on team processes
[that] . . . compile and improve as team members accrue experiences and learn
how to work together better.” Id. at 81 (citations omitted). A theme in the literature is that teams function as a unit better the more their members interact: “[I]t
is also the case that the repeated interactions among individuals that constitute
processes tend to regularize, such that shared structures . . . crystallize and then
serve to guide subsequent process interactions. Process begets structure, which
in turn guides process.” Id.; see also Hackman, supra note 22, at 246–55 (providing examples of benefit from repeated interaction, while cautioning that more is
needed).
78
See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 81; see also Schneider et al.,
supra note 24, at 17–19 (discussing the need for deal team members to have a
common understanding of the tasks to be accomplished).
79
See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 15, at 106 (“As dyadic interactions
become routinized, the focal level of development shifts to the team. A process of
network development yields a flexible network of role interdependencies that enables continuous improvement and adaptability.”).
80
See id.
81
See id. at 86. In one interesting experiment, teams were assembled to
create origami birds. Teams gained efficiency from repeating the task together
multiple times, but they lost efficiency when members of the existing team were
replaced with new members. See id.
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2. Negative Effects from Repeated Interaction
Repeated interaction and teamwork may also have drawbacks in a number of ways. First, even very good team dynamics can lead to groupthink—the tendency for members of a
group to converge on a set of ideas even when they are incorrect.82 This can compromise the ability of team members to
make independent judgments, which is particularly problematic for lawyers, whose task is to protect their clients’ interests
within the group. For example, lawyers, who are not accustomed to judging the market impact of different types of disclosure, may give undue deference to the wishes of the
underwriters who often take the lead in deciding on matters
such as precedent documents, pricing, and the types of information about the issuer to disseminate.83 Second, some literature suggests that teams that work together frequently may
sabotage themselves by becoming overly risk averse. When a
group performs a task several times successfully, for each additional iteration of the task, group members will worry more
about disrupting the group dynamic and take fewer risks even
where they might be warranted, for fear of breaking what is
seen as a successful streak.84
In addition, familiarity may bring other drawbacks that,
while not directly related to team dynamics, are made more
pernicious and harder to detect in the context of teamwork.
The team atmosphere among repeat players in the IPO world
may undermine the ability of the issuer’s counsel to provide the
82
For a discussion of theory and research on groupthink, see generally Marlene E. Turner & Anthony R. Pratkanis, Twenty-Five Years of Groupthink Theory
and Research: Lessons from the Evaluation of a Theory, 73 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 105, 105–15 (1998) (examining the historical development of the groupthink model and the recent responses to the body of empirical
evidence amassed by it); see also IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 7–9 (2d ed., rev. 1983) (articulating first the
theory that groups converge on common ideas that are not always correct); Chip
Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Decision Confidence But
Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of Interactive
Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305,
322–24 (1995).
83
A similar effect has been described as a symptom of “groupthink.” See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE
GROUPS SMARTER 15 (2015) (“[G]roups fall into herds, as group members follow the
statements and actions of those who speak or act first, even if those statements
and actions lead the group in unfortunate . . . directions.”).
84
See Lindred L. Greer, Heather M. Caruso & Karen A. Jehn, The Bigger They
Are, the Harder They Fall: Linking Team Power, Team Conflict, and Performance,
116 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 116, 124 (2011) (showing
the higher levels of well-processed conflict in teams fully explains better team
performance as compared to less successful teams).
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best representation by removing the incentive to take an adversarial posture even when one is warranted.85 The effect of this
would be largely unintentional, indirect, and difficult to detect.
But if the lawyers for the issuer have a high degree of trust and
a sense of affiliation with the bankers on the deal, that may
make it difficult for the lawyers to think about the issuer’s
interests objectively. They may instead take for granted that
the bank’s point of view is more persuasive and aligned with
industry norms. The fact that the managers of issuing companies are often relatively new to capital markets deals compounds the problem, since they rely on their counsel to
acclimate them to the norms of the market.86
The relational considerations of lawyers and clients across
the table may become more serious where the prospect of future work hovers in the background. While it is reasonable to
assume that few lawyers would intentionally prejudice a client,
and indeed none report doing so, it is easy to imagine subtle
impact of the desire to please the party across the table. Members of issuer’s management are in turn unable to adequately
evaluate the services they are being given and take cues from
their advisors about what to do.87
B. Quantitative Measures of Performance
If there are benefits to be gained or costs associated with
familiarity, one would expect to see better outcomes associated
with repeated interaction; if the costs described in the literature are present, we would expect to see them reflected in at
least some of the outcomes associated with high numbers of
repeated interaction, when other factors are held constant. Of
course, selection is a concern with any such analysis, and several strategies are used to rule out this possibility.
In order to assess these relational effects, I examine outcomes that are frequently discussed in the empirical financial
literature on IPOs, applying similar methodology and in some
cases expanding on the methodology in that literature. The
outcome variables described in this section are those for which
data are available and which might plausibly offer insight. For
each outcome variable, I examine repeated interaction among
the following actors in typical IPO deals: (1) underwriter’s coun85

See infra Part IV.
See Interview with Attorney (K) (name withheld by request) (Sept. 16, 2013)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with K].
87
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 8–9 (discussing the issuer’s reliance
upon its advisors to guide it through the unfamiliar IPO process).
86
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sel’s prior IPO deals with the lead underwriter(s); (2) issuer’s
counsel’s prior deals across the table from the lead underwriter(s); (3) issuer’s counsel’s prior IPO deals acting for the
lead underwriter as its counsel; and (4) issuer’s counsel’s prior
deals with the underwriter’s counsel. These interactions were
chosen because they are most likely to reveal something about
the effect of repeated group interaction among lawyers, and
between lawyers and the underwriter. Some of the hypotheses
and results discussed below build upon earlier work done by
the author with respect to the benefits of familiarity between
underwriters and their own counsel. Small portions of those
results are repeated here because they help to interpret the
results reported below by comparison.
1. Accurate Pricing of the Deal
A key task that must be accomplished in any IPO is pricing
the deal, and the accuracy of the price can be an important
indicator of the deal’s success.88 The stock offering price is the
result of negotiations between the issuer (who would like the
price to be higher, all else equal) and the underwriter (who has
an incentive to underprice more strongly, all else equal). This
is a challenging task because there is not yet a trading market
for the issuing company’s shares to use as a benchmark, and
only the issuer and underwriter possess much information
about the issuer and its business prospects. Certainly, a
change in price accuracy associated with repeated interactions
would indicate an impact, although separating positive from
negative is more complicated, as discussed below.
a. Underpricing
The first component of pricing I examine is the amount of
the first-day price increase, or “underpricing.” I examine
whether repeated interactions are associated with greater or
lesser degrees of underpricing (or pricing accuracy), and the
extent to which underpricing changes depending on which
types of actors are repeatedly collaborating. The most basic
null hypothesis is that when issuer’s counsel interact repeatedly with other group members, issuers leave a consistent
amount of money on the table. If the amount of money left on
the table changes with repeated interaction, it would support a
conclusion that familiarity has drawbacks or benefits. This
88

See id. at 9–10.
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hypothesis is tested with respect to repeated interaction between various lawyer and banker pairings.
Numerous studies of IPO performance have looked at firstday returns as a measure of how accurately priced (or underpriced) an offering is.89 However, short-term price performance
is a complicated measure of deal success. Good first-day performance (reflected in a large price increase in the market once
the stock starts trading) is a sign of a good deal, especially if it
is sustained over time, because it reflects large demand for the
stock, which in turn relates to the deal team’s marketing efforts
and the disclosure the deal team creates and disseminates.
However, an overly large first-day return signals a poor outcome for the issuing company, because the large return represents money that the issuing company is giving up, or “leaving
on the table,” as it is frequently described.90
Performance for the first day of trading is typically measured in the IPO literature by taking the difference between the
closing price on the first day of trading and the final offering
price.91 A large first-day price increase for a given stock can be
considered a positive result for the deal because it indicates
strong investor interest; however, any first-day price increase
also represents money that the issuing company could have
captured, and therefore at a large enough magnitude, the initial increase is a negative outcome for the issuer.92
Therefore, while the first-day price increase represents revenue that the issuer could have had from the offering, one
cannot conclude that all underpricing is bad. Bankers routinely attempt to underprice an IPO by approximately 15% because of the positive optics of a short-term rise in stock price
and the resulting momentum, and the need to generate publicity for the issue and demand from institutional investors.93
Managers of issuing companies similarly agree that some level
89
See HANDBOOK of CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 263–75 (reviewing
empirical studies of IPOs).
90
See Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About
Leaving Money on the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 413, 413 (2002) (using the
term “money left on the table” to describe the aggregate proceeds foregone in
underpricing).
91
See Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J.
FIN. 3, 3 (1991).
92
See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 90, at 414; see also Griffith, supra note
17, at 600–30 (discussing the ways in which underpricing creates greater harm
than good for issuers).
93
See Nocera, supra note 17, at 27 (Goldman Sachs Pitch Book describing a
“discount,” usually 15% necessary to ensure adequate post-offering appetite for
stock); Telephone Interview with Attorney (S) (name withheld by request) (July 23,
2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with S]; see also Griffith, supra
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of underpricing is beneficial to a degree, which may explain
why they tolerate a degree of it.94 Thus, up to a certain point,
the incentives of the issuer and the underwriter are aligned
with respect to underpricing.
The incentives of the issuer and the underwriter diverge
with respect to excessively high levels of underpricing, however. Excessive levels of underpricing above the standard 15%
arguably go beyond what is needed to ensure a successful deal
and are thus thought to represent an unnecessary but significant loss to the issuer.95 On the other hand, with respect to
the underwriter, high levels of underpricing create substantial
benefits that frequently outweigh any losses they suffer from
forgone commissions.96 This is because the underwriter only
loses out on 7% (the typical underwriting commission) of the
underpriced amount, but at the same time gains substantial
benefits by allocating the underpriced stock to favored investors, who return the favor through future business and trading
commissions.97 Indeed, the underwriter has an incentive to
underprice far beyond what may be required to ensure a successful deal.98
Consequently, drawing the line between a “good” first-day
price jump and a “bad” one is inherently difficult and depends
on whose perspective one takes. As just explained, underwriters typically claim to intentionally underprice by 15% to ensure
note 17, at 599–612 (describing the potential benefits of underpricing to issuers,
including positive signaling effects and rewarding investor disclosure of demand).
94
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 605–06 n.71 (citing Patricia A. Ryan & Irv
DeGraw, A Brief Comparison of the Oct 2000-June 2002 IPO CFO Results to the
1996-1998 IPO CFO Results (working paper) (reporting that 70% of CFOs responding to a poll conducted in 2002 agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that
“high first day returns are necessary to gain interest in the IPO”); see also Loughran & Ritter, supra note 90, at 416 (explaining that it makes it easier to find
buyers for IPOs and that, by underpricing, investors will engage in rent-seeking
behavior in order to improve their priority for receiving shares in coveted IPOs).
95
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 591–99.
96
See id. at 590–99 (discussing benefits to underwriters from underpricing).
97
See id. at 593–94 (“[U]nderwriters may be able to increase profits above
their base compensation by engaging in underpricing. This may seem contradictory since, as noted above, underwriter compensation is a percentage of aggregate
offering proceeds, which are maximized by raising, not lowering, the offering price.
However, underpricing creates an additional profit opportunity for underwriters
by enabling the practice of spinning.”); Loughran & Ritter, supra note 18, at 8
(describing underpricing as a form of value transfer to the underwriter); Jay Ritter
& Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795,
1815 (2002). Compensation in the form of repeat business was a key issue in the
eToys litigation. See Nocera, supra note 17, at 1–8 (Goldman Sachs internal
documents reflecting compensation “owed” to the bank from investors receiving
underpriced IPO allocations).
98
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 591–99.
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adequate demand and publicity in the market.99 Given the
inexactitude of the pricing process, this is roughly consistent
with the median level of underpricing in the dataset (11%). One
way to separate the “correct” level of underpricing from levels
which are overly large would be to impose an arbitrary boundary of 15%. Such an arbitrary cutoff is bound to sweep in deals
for which underpricing was justifiably higher than the norm.
Nonetheless, once levels of underpricing become very high, it is
difficult to make the case that they were justified.
Another, perhaps more revealing, approach with respect to
group interaction is to examine the relative levels of underpricing associated with repeated interactions of different actors in
the deal, or more precisely, to compare the change in levels of
underpricing that occur when different types of actors interact
repeatedly versus when they are relatively unfamiliar with each
other. Both approaches are explored below.
b. Sustained Price Performance
In addition to first-day price performance and price correction, I also measure stock performance relative to the S&P 500
Index over the first thirty days, sixty days, and ninety days of
the stock’s public trading. The purpose of measuring this is
twofold. First, if the short-term returns on the newly issued
stock remain over longer time periods, it supports an inference
that the market has effectively absorbed the deal team’s information product and that such information has turned out to be
accurate over the first few months.100 On the other hand, if the
large first-day increase dissipates over time, this is an indicator
of poor information availability at the time of the offering, either
because the information created by the deal team was poorly
absorbed by the market or turned out to be inaccurate, due to
insufficient due diligence or inadequate disclosure.101 Second,
if a stock issuance has a very high level of underpricing, and
the high price levels are sustained over time, it implies that the
underpricing is not merely an anomaly in the market but is
either intentional or a result of errors in the pricing process.
One interpretation of the underpricing phenomenon could also
99
See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 18, at 8 (“The resulting average level of
underpricing should then be no more than several percent. Thus, given the use
of bookbuilding, the joint hypothesis that issuers desire to maximize their proceeds and that underwriters act in the best interests of issuers can be rejected
whenever average underpricing exceeds several percent.”).
100
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 12–13 (discussing the role of disclosure in the market’s reaction to securities prices).
101
See id.
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be that it represents a reasonable, if conservative, approach to
pricing by the investment banks, who must bear the risk of
selling all of the stock in a firm commitment underwriting.
They may worry that setting the price too high could result in
an incomplete uptake of stock by investors.102 However, if a
stock rises by an excessive amount on the first day, and its
performance remains strong over the first several months of
trading, it further indicates that a conservative approach was
unwarranted, suggesting either an egregious error on the part
of the bank or self-interested pricing behavior on the part of a
bank trying to capture value out of the deal from the issuer.
Overall, positive effects from teamwork should reveal sustained good performance over the long term. Good long-term
performance may also reveal overly high levels of underpricing,
however, and would therefore be an indication of a transfer of
wealth from the issuer to the underwriter and investors. Indications of what the thirty-, sixty- and ninety-day market performance results imply can be further assessed by looking at
other factors such as the incidence of securities litigation
against the issuer within a short period of time following the
IPO.
c. Price Revision
In order to help separate the negative implications of underpricing from the positive implications of an early price increase, I examine whether repeated interaction has any effect
on the propensity for the issuer and underwriter to agree to a
correct upward price revision—that is, an upward revision from
the initial offer range in the preliminary prospectus that also
corresponds to a price increase in the market.
Upward price revision indicates two things: the first is
greater-than-expected demand for the issuer’s stock, which in
turn can be interpreted as a result of a good marketing effort
that generates high pre-market demand, good disclosure that
gives investors confidence in the issue, and information discovery that aids in the correction of early pricing errors.103 The
second is that the issuing company has been able to capture at
least some of the value of the increase in demand, because a
higher offering price will mean more proceeds for its coffers.
Therefore, if repeated interaction has an effect on the propen102

See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 90, at 416.
See Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and
the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 232 (1993) (describing
how greater-than-anticipated demand results in upward price adjustment).
103
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sity to adjust price upward, it indicates a well-performing deal
in which the issuer has been able to capture more value from
the deal—an overall positive result.
By contrast, if a deal performs extremely well in the market
but there is no upward revision in the final price, it indicates
either that the parties have made an error in their projections
about the market performance of the stock or that the parties
willfully decided to deprive the issuer of proceeds it could have
had.104 The latter scenario is consistent with a situation in
which the underwriter is capturing value for its clients at the
expense of the issuer.
2. Securities Class Action Litigation
The filing of securities litigation soon after the IPO is a poor
deal outcome in the sense that it indicates that stock prices for
IPO companies have fallen105 and some plausible defect in the
disclosure is present that is related to the price drop.106 Although the filing of litigation can be precipitated by numerous
factors outside the control of the members of a deal team, an
increased occurrence of litigation when controlling for other
factors107 implicates the lawyers’ performance in the deal,
since uncovering information through due diligence and limit104
Cf. Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of Why Initial
Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 66 (1993) (discussing a
theory of underpricing as an artifact of error, combined with abundance of
caution).
105
A fall in the price of the issuer’s stock is the basis for the damages sought
in most lawsuits. See id. at 35 (“[T]here is no legal basis for suing because a
security was priced too high—either in the sense that the open-market price was
lower than the offering price, or that the offering price was higher than the
‘intrinsic’ value.”).
106
See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012) (requiring a
misstatement or omission in the registration statement as a prerequisite to legal
action); Securities Act of 1933 § 12 (requiring a misstatement or omission in a
prospectus or oral communication as a prerequisite to legal action); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2016) (providing for liability for any material misstatement or omission or scheme
to defraud).
Class actions were filed within one year with respect to 119 of the issuers in
the dataset, after discounting multiple separate class actions filed with respect to
the same issuer. This number constitutes 4.4% of the dataset.
107
Primary factors identified in the literature bearing a relationship to litigation include the size of the deal (as the log of gross proceeds), the total assets of
the company after the IPO, the market capitalization of the issuer after the IPO,
and the market share of the underwriter, reflecting the intuition that companies
with “deep pockets” draw more litigation. See Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu,
Litigation Risk and IPO Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 315–19 (2002). These
factors are used as controls in the regression analysis discussed below.
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ing liability through accurate disclosure is one of the lawyers’
key tasks.108
A few caveats are in order with respect to litigation as an
indicator. First, securities litigation can occur based on periodic disclosure or other statements made by the issuer and
may have nothing to do with the IPO.109 When securities lawsuits allege causes of action under sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of
the Securities Act, they necessarily relate to disclosure that
was produced as part of the offering. Nonetheless, class actions often also allege liability under Rule 10b-5, as there are
often procedural hurdles to bringing an action under sections
11 and 12.110
In addition, it is entirely possible that such lawsuits have
limited or no merit. Spurious litigation was a central concern
voiced by Congress when it passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.111 The possibility that meritless lawsuits are included in the data cannot be ruled out, and thus
some of the data may not be indicative of a poor deal outcome.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that lawsuits filed do,
on average, have at least arguable merit and basis in the disclosure. As a robustness measure, I limit the dataset to class
actions filed within the first year after the IPO, even though the
statute of limitations for actions under sections 11 and 12 is
the shorter of one year after the discovery of the facts giving rise
to a claim of material misstatement or omission,112 or three
years, and the shorter of two years after the discovery of facts
giving rise to a claim of material misstatement or omission, or
five years for actions under Rule 10b-5.113 Although using all
of the class actions would provide even stronger results, limiting them helps to ensure that lawsuits in the dataset are more
likely to be meritorious and related to the initial offering.114
108

See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 4–5.
See Marilyn F. Johnson et al., Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 627, 627–30 (2007)
(documenting the prevalence of lawsuits based on earning statements, particularly where they have been revised).
110
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C §§ 77k(a) (standing requirement); § 77(l)(2) (requirement
for purchase pursuant to a prospectus); § 77(m) (statute of limitations for §§ 11
and 12).
111
See Joshua D. Fulop, Agency Costs and the Strike Suit: Reducing Frivolous
Litigation Through Empowerment of Shareholders, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 213, 213–14
(2007) (describing the strike suit problem).
112
15 U.S.C. § 77(m) (2012).
113
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2012).
114
See id.
109
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The second caveat regarding litigation is that the filing of a
lawsuit, even if meritorious, is not necessarily an indicator of
defects in the performance of the lawyers. Many factors
outside of the control of legal counsel might contribute. Nonetheless, part of the lawyers’ duty is to insulate the company
from litigation, especially spurious litigation through disclosure.115 Thus, when controlling for factors that typically attract litigation, one might hypothesize that there would be less
litigation associated with lawyer repeated interaction, if it is the
case that familiarity is beneficial. Nonetheless, if repeated interactions are associated with more class actions after holding
other factors relevant to litigation constant, it provides another
piece of evidence pointing to negative effects of group work.
3. Prospectus Disclosure
As a key marketing document, regulatory filing, and point
of focus for telling the issuer’s story to the market, the disclosure can have a significant impact on transaction outcomes. In
a sense, the disclosure is a proxy for the performance of the
various deal participants, and in particular the lawyers in the
deal, since lawyers are the chief drafters of the document and
conduct much of the due diligence investigation that forms the
basis of the disclosure.116
It is difficult to measure the quality of disclosure in the
aggregate. However, other studies have used measures of positive disclosure and negative disclosure to glean information
about the information content of prospectuses.117 These measures typically involve looking at the ratios of portions of the
prospectus considered negative, primarily the risk factors, to
all other portions of the prospectus.118 Although this is a very
rough measure, it provides a basic idea of the informational
completeness of the prospectus, as well as the deal team’s perception of the risks of the company.
115
See Telephone Interview with Attorney (F) (name withheld by request) (Oct.
20, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with F].
116
See Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 16 n.10.
117
See, e.g., Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, The Information Content
of IPO Prospectuses, 23 R. FIN. STUD. 2821, 2830–40 (2010); James C. Spindler,
IPO Underpricing, Disclosure, and Litigation Risk 9 (U.S.C. Ctr. L. Econ. & Org.,
Research Paper No. 09-9, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1396818
[https://perma.cc/PHH4-L44V]; see also Tom Arnold et al., The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and Subsequent IPO Returns, 39 FIN. MGMT 1497,
1497–1519 (2010) (reviewing past studies and claiming that ambiguity in prospectuses promotes underpricing).
118
See Spindler, supra note 117, at 9–10 (employing an approach looking at
ratios of positive to negative disclosure).
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The proportion of negative disclosure in a document, all
else equal, is also an indirect way to examine the lawyers’ ability and willingness to carry out an issuer’s wishes. The disclosure is chiefly drafted by the lawyers and the underwriter
acting in concert—and sometimes in tension—with personnel
from the issuing company. Capital markets lawyers report that
issuing companies’ management often push to provide copious
positive disclosure about their companies, while the underwriters and lawyers try to limit and temper the disclosure by including more negative information, ostensibly for the purpose
of warding off liability. The parties’ conflicting goals regarding
disclosure manifest most palpably in the risk factor section of
the prospectus, the drafting of which is driven by the underwriters and counsel.119 Risk factors relating to a company and
its business are required to be disclosed by the Securities Act
and the SEC’s regulations. Moreover, risk disclosure is thought
to protect issuers from lawsuits by providing adequate warnings and meaningful cautionary language with respect to the
other disclosure in the prospectus, especially projections for
future company performance and forward-looking statements.120 However, the extent to which risk factors are prophylactic is unclear, and it is possible that they merely shift the
basis for litigation to other elements of the disclosure.121 This
conclusion is supported by at least some work in financial
economics that has found evidence that greater risk factor disclosure may actually encourage litigation by obfuscating material risks related to the issuer.122
In addition, negative disclosure in the risk factors can
lower the price that investors are willing to pay for the stock.
Risk disclosure thus might be protective, but overlawyering,
overreliance on precedent or boilerplate, or grandstanding with
respect to risk factors can be very costly for the issuer. Thus,
risk disclosure is a somewhat rough and ambiguous measure
of the team performance of lawyers in repeated interactions.
High levels of risk disclosure indicate counsel who were able to
prevail over issuers’ preferences to present a positive picture of
the company. That might be good if it reduces litigation risk,
119
See id.; see also Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 117, at 2830 (using text
analysis to identify influences on disclosure).
120
See Spindler, supra note 117, at 10.
121
Cf. Johnson et al., supra note 109, at 627 (noting a shift in the basis of
liability claims to earnings statements).
122
See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 117, at 2830 (discussing evidence that
disclosure is a factor contributing to uncertainty).
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but very high levels of risk disclosure might cost issuers more
than they are worth through lost proceeds.
4. Length of Time to Offering
The length of time between the issuer’s filing of Form S-1
with the SEC provides an indication of the efficiency with which
a deal group is working. The filing of the S-1 allows the IPO
marketing effort to commence and typically occurs between
one and three months before the ultimate offering date but may
be much longer.123 Although many factors can cause a deal to
be delayed outside the control of the parties at the table, such
as market conditions,124 comments from the SEC,125 or
problems within the issuing company, it is reasonable to hypothesize that good team dynamics might have a systematic
effect on the efficiency with which the deal is closed.126 Therefore, a systematic increase in deal length might indicate reduced teamwork, while a systematic decrease in deal length
would indicate positive benefits of improved teamwork.127
III
DATA AND ANALYSIS
The following discussion explains the empirical findings of
this study and their implications for the hypotheses developed
above. The section sets out the sources of data and methodology, and describes the results from regression analyses for the
interactions between underwriter’s counsel’s and the lead underwriter(s) with the issuer’s counsel and underwriter’s coun123

GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, IPO GUIDEBOOK 8 (2015).
Schneider et al., supra note 24, at 24–25 (“[I]f market conditions have
worsened materially after the letter of intent stage, the issue must either come to
the market at a price below that originally contemplated, or it must be postponed
until conditions improve.”).
125
Id. at 27 (“There is a wide variation in the time required for the SEC to
process a registration statement. Relevant factors include the level of the Commission’s backlog of filings and the time of the year. There is normally a considerable rush of filings at the end of each calendar quarter, and particularly at the end
of March for filings with financial statements as of December 31. The SEC’s
current policy calls for the issuance of an initial letter of comments within thirty
days of the filing of a registration statement, but the delay is often longer and at
times has exceeded one hundred days.”).
126
This conclusion comports with practitioner descriptions of the essential
characteristics of a smooth deal. See, e.g., id. at 16–17 (“Close cooperation is
required among counsel for the company, the underwriters’ counsel, the accountants, and the printer. Unless each knows exactly what the others expect, additional delay, expense, and irritation are predictable.”).
127
This analysis expands on previous work done by the author. See Jeremy
R. McClane, The Sum of Its Parts: The Lawyer-Client Relationship in Initial Public
Offerings, 84 FORDHAM L. REV., 131, 170 (2015).
124
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sel. I analyze each type of repeated interaction with respect to
the performance variables, noting the implications for the various hypotheses regarding the benefits or drawbacks of close
relational dynamics and teamwork.
The data on IPOs used in this Article were drawn from
interviews with lawyers and investment bankers in several
large firms based in New York, London, Washington, D.C., and
Palo Alto, CA. The quantitative data was gathered from a number of publicly available sources. The basis for the list of IPOs
is the Kenney-Patton database of de novo128 IPOs in the United
States from June 1996 through December 2010.129 The deals
from that dataset were cross-checked with the Thomson One
dealsheet record to confirm the date, ticker, and issuer
name.130 From Thomson One, I added the names of the banks
involved in the underwriting syndicate for each deal, including
the names of the lead underwriters, bookrunners or joint bookrunners, the lead underwriters’ counsel and issuers’ counsel,
data about the involvement of venture capitalists, as well as the
age of the issuing company. From the same source I also obtained the initial price range filed with the SEC, as well as the
final price agreed by the issuer and underwriters, from which I
determined whether the final price was revised up or down
from the initial range. Twenty-two records were dropped either
because information could not be found on the issue in the
Thomson One database or because the Center for Research in
Security Prices (“CRSP”) database did not contain information
on the initial or final price. This resulted in a dataset consisting of 2,265 IPOs spanning fifteen years.
I then gathered each company’s registration document (the
Form S-1, or its equivalent) and prospectus from the SEC’s
EDGAR database.131 From these documents, I gathered the
names of the attorneys for both issuers and underwriters, as
128
The database excludes offerings of capital trusts, securitizations, IPOs of
preferred stock, and spin-offs.
129
For more information on the database, see Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Guide to the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
from 1990 Through 2010, U.C. DAVIS (Sept. 2013), http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/
faculty/webpages/kenney/misc/Firm_IPO_Database_Guide.pdf [https://perma
.cc/TNU5-DLMK].
130
Thomson ONE, Trusted Investment Research Tools, THOMSON REUTERS,
http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/tools-applications/tradinginvestment-tools/thomson-one-investment-research-tools.html?gclid=CjwKEAiA
x4anBRDz6JLYjMDxoQYSJAA4loRmqel_bXT8gpjPqFxMyt6A9VmdVOXXoM_u9o
MbvA_3EhoCJdvw_wcB (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) [perma.cc/32H7-K3V5] [hereinafter Thomson One Database].
131
EDGAR: Company Filings, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/
companysearch.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) [perma.cc/7QXZ-464P].
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well as data on the geographic location of the law firms and the
underwriters. From the prospectuses I gathered word counts
for each document and for each individual section of the document. The word counts ignore information contained in tables
and charts, which is consistent with methodology used in other
research on IPOs. The rationale is that pure word counts,
while constituting a very rough estimate of the types of disclosure included, are objective and do not suffer from the potential
bias associated with hand-coded disclosure elements.132
I used information from the CRSP database to obtain data
on each stock’s performance over time.133 Data on class action
litigation was taken from the Stanford Law School Securities
Class Action Clearinghouse.134 From Compustat, I then gathered data on company assets, book value per share, leverage,
and fees paid to counsel.
The identities of each IPO’s lead underwriters were taken
from this data set. An investment bank is considered a lead
underwriter if it is either the sole bookrunner or a joint bookrunner.135 Where investment banks merge with other banks, I
treat each merging bank as though it has disappeared and the
newly merged bank as if it is a new bank. I use this method to
maintain a conservative approach to tracking repeat transactions between investment banks and law firms. Where there is
more than one bookrunner, observations are de-weighted
accordingly.
The identity of counsel for the lead underwriters and issuing companies are similarly taken from this data.136 As with
132
See Spindler, supra note 117, at 910 (noting that this method “has the
advantage of being objective, as it does not rely upon subjective evaluations of
particular disclosures (such as coding a line of disclosure as ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and
does not require subjective index weighting”).
Word counts for this study were taken for a total of 2,258 prospectuses. A
small number (7) of prospectuses were excluded due to transcription errors in the
database.
133
CRSP US Stock Databases, CTR. RES. SEC. PRICES http://www.crsp.com/
products/research-products/crsp-us-stock-databases (last visited Apr. 9, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/M2HL-2MM4].
134
Stanford Law School, Securities Class Action Clearinghouse: A Collaboration with Cornerstone Research, STANFORD, http://securities.stanford.edu (last
visited Apr. 9, 2016) [https://perma.cc/FZE5-9MG3].
135
This methodology is similar to that used in prior work. See, e.g., Loughran
& Ritter, supra note 18, at 13 (describing the relationship between lead underwriter and bookrunner designations in empirical work). The most frequent lead
underwriters are Goldman Sachs (217), Merrill Lynch (154), Morgan Stanley
(137), Lehman Brothers (131), and JP Morgan (122).
136
The most frequent managers’ counsel are Wilson Sonsini Goodrich &
Rosati (176), Latham & Watkins (160), Davis Polk & Wardwell (151), Cravath,
Swaine & Moore (111), and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (106).
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investment banks, law firm mergers are treated as the disappearance of each old firm and the appearance of a new firm. In
the rare cases of multiple firms representing a party, the firms
are treated as a single unit for that transaction.
Combinations of underwriters, their counsel, and issuer’s
counsel are grouped together, and then the offer date is used to
construct variables representing how often a certain underwriter-counsel and counsel-counsel pair have worked together
in the previous one year, two years, and three years for each
new issue. Further, names of individual counsel collected from
the Form S-1 documents filed with the SEC137 are then
matched based on whether the same individuals were present
on a deal in which the same law firms were involved, and a
variable is created to represent the number of repeat deals in
which at least one individual attorney from a given firm appears in successive deals.
A. Empirical Results
1. Regression Analysis on Performance Metrics
For each type of repeated interaction observed in the data
(underwriters with their own counsel, underwriters’ encounters with the issuer’s counsel on opposite sides of a deal,
the underwriters’ encounters with issuer’s counsel when issuer’s counsel has recently been the underwriter’s counsel,
and frequent encounters between the two sets of counsel), I
analyze price performance, probability of correct price revision,
incidence of litigation, and length of time to complete a transaction. Some of the results with respect to the interactions between investment banks and their own counsel have been
reported in my previous research. I repeat them briefly here for
the sake of comparison because they are helpful for understanding the implications of the new findings.
With regard to price performance of the IPO stock, the time
to deal completion, and the proportion of various types of disclosure, I employ ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression
analysis138 to estimate the relationship between repeated interactions and the outcomes of interest. For price performance,
the outcomes measured are the first-day bounce—the stock
137

My thanks go to Robert Bartlett III for this suggestion.
See Appendix Table 1 for the formal model and variables used in OLS
regressions. OLS is a statistical method that attempts to determine the relationship between a set of explanatory variables and an outcome variable of interest,
by finding a function that approximately fits a set of data. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 53 (2d ed. 2010).
138
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price increase during the first day of trading (See Appendix
Table 1), as well as the price change after thirty, sixty, and
ninety days of trading, all relative to the performance of the
S&P Index to account for the effect of overall market movements (See Appendix Table 2). For the time to deal completion,
the outcome measured is the number of days from the filing of
the S-1 until the offering date. With respect to disclosure, the
relevant outcomes are the proportion of each prospectus occupied by risk factors, business descriptions, and management’s
discussion and analysis.
With respect to the probability of price correction (See Appendix Table 3) as well as class action litigation (See Appendix
Table 4), I employ probit models.139 For upward price revision,
the model estimates the change in probability that the pricing
negotiation will result in higher price than that set out in the
initial filing range, when the market performance is good
enough that it would justify a higher price and when parties
have worked together repeatedly. With respect to litigation, the
model estimates the change in probability that a securities
class action lawsuit will be filed in the first six months, and the
first year after the IPO offer date when parties have worked
together repeatedly.
The models each incorporate a number of other independent variables, in line with prior empirical literature on
IPOs.140 These include fixed effects141 for IPO year and the
issuing company’s industry (as determined according to the

139
See Appendix Table 2 for the formal probit model and variables used. A
probit model is a statistical model in which the outcome variable can take on only
one of two values; it is useful for estimating the probably of an event occurring,
versus the probability of the event not occurring. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note
138, at 471, 561.
140
See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 117, at 2830–33; see also HANDBOOK
of CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 276–79 (summarizing empirical evidence
from prior studies on the determinants of underpricing of IPOs).
141
See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 138, at 300. Fixed effects provide a method of
controlling for variation within certain categories of variable by removing the
mean of the observations for the dependent variable of interest. For example, in
an OLS regression using first-day price jump (i.e., underpricing) as the dependent
variable, fixed effects for (inter alia) each year are used. This allows for variation
in overall underpricing from year to year by removing the mean underpricing for
each year and controlling for the variation in underpricing that is specific to that
particular year. For example, if 1999 was a year that saw a particularly large
amount of underpricing, the fixed effect would remove the year-specific average of
the underpricing and leave only the variation attributable to other factors. The
same is done for each IPO quarter, each lead underwriter, each industry, and the
interaction of each industry and year.
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Standard Industry Classification, or “SIC,” code142 as well as
other classifications used in the literature) to control for market conditions that changed over time and in various industries. I also use fixed effects for each investment bank in order
to allow for variation in outcome variables associated with each
lead underwriter, as well as the interaction between the year,
industry, and underwriter variables. In addition, for all specifications I control for the IPO size measured in terms of the
natural log of the gross proceeds of the offering, a variable
frequently used as a proxy for deal quality, as well as the size of
the issuing company.143
I perform each analysis using a number of alternative specifications to test the robustness of the model. Appendix Tables
7 and 8 report the results of these robustness checks for analysis of the first-day price increase and the probability of litigation under the alternative specifications.
a. Pricing Accuracy and Market Performance
This section will describe the results for each set of repeated interactions with respect to first-day performance, and
performance relative to the rest of the market at thirty, sixty,
and ninety days post-offering.
For each set of parties studied (the underwriter(s) and underwriter’s counsel, the underwriter(s) and issuer’s counsel,
underwriter’s counsel and issuer’s counsel) there is a significant first-day price jump for deals in which the parties have
worked together repeatedly—the stock’s price in the market
increases significantly over the initial offering price in the prospectus.144 Regression analysis reveals a pattern in which
each successive IPO deal that two of the parties have done in
the past year is associated with an incrementally larger increase in the first-day price jump.
The graphs below illustrate the patterns with respect to
first-day price increase found in the raw data. Figure 1 shows
the percentage change in opening day price jump for an IPO
142
SIC codes are used to categorize the industry of issuing companies and are
assigned for each securities issuer. See Barker, supra note 63, at 68.
143
In line with the financial economic literature on IPOs, the regressions
described in this Article use the natural log of the gross proceeds of each IPO in
order to mitigate skewness in the distribution of dollar amounts. See HANDBOOK of
CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 276–79. In the alternative specifications in
Appendix Tables 7 and 8, I also use the size of the company (measured by total
assets) and the book value per share as alternative ways to control for deal
quality. These yield the same results.
144
See Appendix Table 1.
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stock in which the various parties to the deal have worked
together between one and five-plus times within the previous
year. The relationship evident between repeated interactions
and the opening day jump continues to hold in regression analyses that control for many factors that may also influence the
opening day price jump, which are detailed below.

100
50
1

Average Percent Increase

150

FIGURE 1. REPEATED LAWYER INTERACTIONS AND OPENING DAY
PRICE INCREASE

1

2

3
4
Interactions in the Past Year

5+

Bank-Bank’s Counsel

Bank-Issuer’s Counsel

Counsel-Counsel

Bank-Issuer’s Counsel, Recent Client

i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
The IPO stock’s opening day price performance (or
“bounce”) and its relation to the number of times the underwriter and its counsel have worked together across different
time periods is the first performance measure analyzed. Panel
A of Appendix Table 1 shows the results, demonstrating a
strong and significant effect from increased bank-counsel interactions, even after year, industry, and bank fixed effects as
well as other controls are used. Each additional IPO that the
underwriter and its counsel have done together in the past year
is associated with a 3.1% to 5.1% higher opening day price
jump. For deals in the past two years, each additional deal is
associated with an average 1.9% to 3.6% additional price jump;
for deals in the past three years, the increase is 1.5% to
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2.9%.145 When only deals in which specific lawyers can be
identified appear repeatedly, the results remain significant,
and the marginal increase becomes 11.2% to 14.0% for deals in
the past year and 7.7% to 9.7% for deals in the preceding three
years. The fact that the magnitude increases when interactions between individual lawyers are analyzed may be a result
of the fact that the confidence intervals are large for these
estimates. Nonetheless, they are still statistically significant,
further indicating that the interpersonal interactions are driving the results.
The next performance measure to be examined is the percentage price change of the issued stock over the first thirty,
sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to the percentage
change in the S&P Index over the same set of days. The controls in all cases are dummy variables146 for the IPO year, the
SIC category, and the interaction of those two sets.147 These
controls are consistent with the financial economic literature
on IPOs.148 Clustered robust standard errors are used for each
regression.149
For the thirty-, sixty-, and ninety-day price performance,
the upward trend in first-day price increase remains evident.150 The effect of each additional interaction on the relative
change in a stock’s price with respect to the S&P Index after
thirty trading days is 4.4% when the interactions are within the
past year. This number drops to 2.8% when the interaction is
in the past three years. Fewer recent interactions between a
bank and law firm are associated with lower price performance
over the thirty-, sixty-, and ninety-day periods. The effect remains strong for the first ninety days of trading, for which each
deal in the past year is associated with a 7.4% increase, declin145
See Appendix Table 1, Panel A1. The two specifications look at the number
of prior deals between the underwriter and its counsel within the past year, two
years, and three years preceding any IPO. Specifications are shown with and
without fixed effects for each underwriter.
146
See Appendix Table 1, Panel A2.
147
When fixed effects for each bank are introduced, the result remains, but
the significance diminishes.
148
See, e.g., Spindler, supra note 117, at 18 (detailing the use of dummy
variables to control for certain offering and issuer characteristics).
149
In addition, to eliminate the possibility of clustering with respect to industry, bank, and year, each regression uses clustered robust standard errors. See
A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Robust Inference with
Multi-way Clustering 2–4 (U.C. Davis Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 09-9,
2009), http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/58397/1/609322079.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EMK5-HKNX]. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this
suggestion.
150
See Appendix Table 2, Panel A1.
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ing to a 4.1% increase in relative price for deals completed
together within the preceding three years. These results remain when deals are analyzed for which individual lawyers can
be identified.
ii. Underwriter’s Counsel and Issuer’s Counsel
The second set of interactions I analyze is that between the
two sets of counsel to each deal, again in relation to the issued
stock’s first-day price jump. The results once again demonstrate a significant effect, albeit smaller than the one observed
for the underwriter and its counsel alone.151 Each additional
IPO that the two sets of lawyers have done together in the past
year is associated with a 2.3% to 3.3% higher opening day price
jump. For deals in the past two years, each additional deal is
associated with an average 1.4–2.1% additional price jump; for
deals in the past three years, the increase is 1.1–1.6%. When
the set of deals is narrowed to those for which individual lawyers can be identified working together repeatedly, the marginal increase is much higher: 69.0–69.2% for each repeat deal
in the past one year, and 47.5–51.7% on average repeat deals
in the past three years. The effect is sustained for the first
thirty, sixty, and ninety days of trading.152 Once again, the
larger estimates when individual lawyers are analyzed must be
viewed in light of the fact that the confidence intervals are
large, and there are fewer repeated interactions among lawyers
whose identities can be confirmed from the S-1. The large
number is therefore not necessarily indicative of the typical
increase one would associate with each repeated interaction.
Nonetheless, the estimates are still statistically significant, further indicating that the interpersonal interactions among
counsel contribute to the results.
iii. Underwriter and Issuer’s Counsel
For each IPO, I also look at whether the issuer’s counsel
has been issuer’s counsel in past transactions involving the
same underwriter. For instance, in a given deal, if WilmerHale
is the issuer’s counsel and Morgan Stanley is the underwriting
bank, I look at the number of prior IPOs in the past year, two
years, and three years in which WilmerHale represented an
issuer and Morgan Stanley led the deal.
151
152

See Appendix Table 1, Panel C1, C2.
See Appendix Table 2, Panel C1, C2.
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For these parties, the relationship between opening day
price jump and recent deals together has a relatively large magnitude compared to the other sets of interactions discussed so
far. Each additional IPO in the past year is associated with a
6.7–8.2% higher opening day price jump. For deals in the past
two years, each additional deal is associated with an average
4.8–6.6% additional price jump; for deals in the past three
years, the increase is 3.7–5.6%.153 When individual lawyers
are matched in repeated deals, the associated marginal price
increase is much larger: from 24.4–31.9% for repeated interactions in the past year, and 12.8–19.0% for repeated interactions in the preceding three years.
A similar result is observed for the percentage price change
over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to
the percentage change in the S&P Index over the same set of
days.154 The controls in all cases are dummies for the IPO
year, the SIC category, and the interaction of those two sets.
The average marginal price increase at thirty days is 12.2% for
each additional interaction across the table within the past
year, declining to 7.3% for interactions within the past three
years. The ninety-day marginal price increase relative to the
S&P Index is 14.5% for additional interactions in the preceding
year, dropping to 9.1% for interactions within the past three
years.155
iv. Underwriter and Issuer’s Counsel “Conflict” Deals
To assess across-the-table interactions more thoroughly, I
look at a subset of the transactions in which the issuer’s counsel has not only encountered the underwriter previously but
has served as the same underwriter’s counsel recently. I define
“recent” to be within the past year. For instance, in the example from the preceding section, if WilmerHale is issuer’s counsel and Morgan Stanley is the underwriting bank, I look at
whether or not WilmerHale has acted as Morgan Stanley’s
counsel in an IPO within the preceding year. For ease of reference, I call these “conflict” deals because of the potential for a
conflict of interest.156 As before, I control for the standard
factors that would influence IPO performance, as well geo153

See Appendix Table 1, Panel B1, B2.
See Appendix Table 2, Panel B1, B2.
155
All results are significant at the 1% level. See Appendix Table 2, Panel B1.
156
I note that use of the term “conflict deals” may make the analysis seem
deterministic. I use the term for word economy in this Article, but I did not
originally approach the analysis using that frame.
154
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graphic location of the issuer’s counsel and the underwriters.
As in all other specifications, I look at firm level interactions, as
well as interactions involving the same individual lawyers.
Conflict deals bear a strong relationship to large opening
day price jump both at the firm level and at the level of individual lawyers. Each conflict deal is associated with a 12.2–14.4%
increase in first-day price jump. When isolating only the deals
for which the same individual lawyers encounter each other
repeatedly, the opening day price jump above what might be
considered the “standard” 20% is between 16.1% and 21.5%
higher on average. This effect is consistent over the first thirty,
sixty, and ninety days that the stock trades.157
v. Analysis of Price Performance Results
The contrasts in the results between different sets of actors
are instructive. From the regression analysis above, it appears
that frequency of interaction bears a strong positive relationship to stock performance. For each additional interaction in
the sets of parties discussed above, the marginal effect on price
performance is positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect is markedly greater when an issuer’s counsel is in a potential “conflict” situation, with each additional
interaction resulting in a multiple of the 15–20% level of underpricing reported to be the norm. This raises the possibility of
agency costs, even while indicating that repeated interaction
leads to better deals.
A notable trend in the results is that the value of each
additional interaction decreases as the time horizon increases.
This indicates that repeated interactions that occurred longer
ago have a lower impact on the deal, all else equal. That result
is consistent with what one would expect if repeated interaction
affects deal outcomes through familiarity, norming, and teamwork: if the chances to interact are fewer and further between,
the team dynamic will be less strong.
b. Price Correction
As previously discussed, underpricing complicates the results with respect to price performance. Therefore, it is important to tease apart price performance that indicates a
successful deal from price performance that indicates excessive loss of value for the issuer. Analyzing price correction
157

See Appendix Table 1, Panels D1, D2.
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provides a useful way to see whether or not interactions among
the parties also have any mitigating effects on underpricing.
Recall that price correction is the process by which the
offering price is changed from the initial offering estimate (set
out in their preliminary prospectus) to the final price (which the
initial investors pay).158 To test whether or not there is price
correction, I first construct a measure of “strong performers,”
which are stocks whose price after 30 trading days is at least
20% and 30% higher than the upper range of their filing price
range (controlling for the performance of the S&P Index during
the same thirty days).159
I look at the probability of upward price revisions for these
issues separately for IPOs where the bank and counsel, bank
and issuer’s counsel, and the two sets of counsel are frequent
collaborators, and where that is not the case. For this analysis,
“frequent collaborators” are bank-counsel or counsel-counsel
pairs that have worked together at least three times prior to the
current IPO in the past two years. If repeated interactions result in greater error rates, or collusion to excessively underprice, one would expect the probability of upward price revision
to be lower when the bank and counsel are frequent
collaborators.
i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
When the underwriter and its counsel have collaborated
frequently in the recent past, a deal is 8.7–9.3% more likely to
see correct upward price revision.160 This suggests both lower
error rates for deal pricing generally and more independence on
the part of underwriter’s counsel when there are more frequent
interactions. This finding also further supports a conclusion
that relational dynamics between the underwriter and its counsel improve the deal. When the results are narrowed to only
those deals for which specific lawyers can be identified as
working repeatedly with underwriters, the results remain significant, although the magnitude goes down to 4.3–4.5% more
likely to revise up. This confirms that the effect exists in relation to individuals instead of firms or other factors. The lower
magnitude might be explained by the fact that the effect is
weaker for individuals, or it could be a measurement error due
to the fact that only a few of the lawyers who would be doing
158
159
160

See supra Part II.B.1.a.
See Appendix Table 3.
See Appendix Table 3, Panel A1.
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deals can actually be identified, making the sample of individuals necessarily underinclusive.
ii. Underwriter’s Counsel and Issuer’s Counsel
I again examine the probability of correct upward price
revision, this time with respect to the two sets of counsel.161
There is a weakly significant (at the 10% level) relationship
between repeated interactions and the probability of upward
price revision when the first-day bounce is 20% or more. No
other significant results are seen.162
iii. Underwriter and Issuer’s Counsel
With respect to frequent interactions between the issuer’s
counsel and the underwriter, the analysis reveals no significant
relationship to the probability of upward price revision for
strong performers.163 Thus there is no evidence that the issuer’s counsel is more likely to impact the correction of the
underpricing problem when it has encountered the same underwriter across the table frequently.
I again examine the probability of correct upward price
revision for deals in which potential conflict exists to determine
if issuer’s counsel undertakes a countervailing corrective response in such circumstances.164 Again the analysis reports
no significant relationship, which is consistent with—albeit not
determinative of—an agency problem.
c. Securities Litigation
Another potential indicator of the quality of deal outcomes
is the incidence of securities litigation ensuing from the IPO.
Securities litigation can occur for both meritorious and spurious reasons, and does not necessarily implicate the quality of
the lawyers’ representation or their relationship with their clients.165 Nonetheless, a systematic pattern of either increased
or decreased litigation provides a proxy for the quality of the
due diligence and disclosure.
161
162
163
164
165

See
Id.
See
See
See

Appendix Table 3, Panels C1, C2.
Appendix Table 3, Panels B1, B2.
Appendix Table 3, Panels D1, D2.
supra note 147.
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FIGURE 2. REPEATED COUNSEL INTERACTIONS AND INCIDENCE OF
SECURITIES LITIGATION WITHIN ONE YEAR
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Figure 2 above illustrates the striking trend with respect to
repeated interaction and securities litigation. The graph shows
an association between a markedly higher incidence of securities class actions and the frequency of recent collaboration
between issuer’s counsel and the underwriter. This graph is
merely descriptive of the raw data; below, I report the results of
regression analyses including factors that may affect litigation.166 As previously mentioned, in order to examine whether
repeated interaction has any impact on litigation, I use a probit
model to estimate the relationship between repeated interaction and the probability that a company will have a lawsuit filed
within six months, and within one year of an IPO.167
166
As I discuss in more detail below, a body of literature has also connected
litigation to underpricing, explaining underpricing as a possible insurance and
deterrent to litigation. See, e.g., Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses
and Legal Liability in Initial Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545 (1996) (examining the viability of the litigation theory); Lowry & Shu, supra note 107, at 326–33
(finding evidence to support the litigation hypothesis); see also Spindler, supra
note 117, at 31–35 (exploring legal and empirical dimensions of the litigation
hypothesis). But see Alexander, supra note 104, at 54–61 (providing a detailed
critique of the litigation hypothesis). As I will explain further below, statistical
analysis in this paper points to underpricing being a factor encouraging litigation,
as opposed to preventing it.
167
I limit the analysis to one year for two reasons. The first is that IPO-related
class actions are typically filed within the first year after the offering. See Lowry &
Shu, supra note 107, at 315 (discussing statistics on lawsuits filed). The second

R
R
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i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
The regressions reveal no significant relationship between
litigation and frequent interaction between the underwriter and
its counsel within the preceding year.168 The lack of significant
result remains for deals within the past two and three years, as
well as for deals for which individual lawyer identities can be
confirmed. The absence of a significant result is not the same
as a precise result showing no correlation. Nonetheless, the
lack of relationship is noteworthy when compared to the results below that demonstrate a strong relationship between the
probability of litigation and other types of repeated
interactions.
ii. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
When both sets of law firms have worked together more
frequently, the analysis shows a slightly (0.3%) lower
probability of litigation for the first six months, but no significant result is apparent for longer periods.169 The six-month
results might suggest a further positive benefit from lawyers’
frequent interactions. Since a primary task of the lawyers is to
limit liability, one would hope to see better working relationships result in more effectively preventing litigation, notwithstanding the fact that litigation can be caused by numerous
factors outside of lawyers’ control.
iii. Issuer’s Counsel Interactions with the
Underwriter
With respect to such deals where the potential for conflict
of interest is high, the results of the analysis are particularly
striking: when the issuer’s counsel has represented the underwriter within the preceding year, there is a 2.9–3.5% increase
in the probability of a securities class action lawsuit within one
year of the IPO.170 Given that the baseline probability of having
reason is to remain conservative in my empirical approach. Other studies of
securities litigation also have used a one-year window to assess whether or not
litigation is IPO related. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 607 (2007)
(“Although plaintiffs’ attorneys may file suit up to 3 years after the IPO, I focus on
the first-year performance to screen out the impact of factors unrelated to the IPO
on aftermarket performance.”). The results in this Article, however, would remain
the same even if a three-year window were used.
168
See Appendix Table 4, Panels A1, A2.
169
See Appendix Table 4, Panels C1, C2.
170
See Appendix Table 4, Panel D1. The probability of securities class action
litigation within three years increases by 5.8% for each underwriter representa-
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a securities class action filed for all deals in the dataset is 4.4%,
the results of the analysis represent a significant increase.
When the dataset is narrowed to only deals for which individual
lawyers can be identified, the results become stronger. The
probability of a class action within six months becomes significant and increases 2.0–2.7%; the probability of a suit within
one year increases by 4.4–4.7%. The finding further suggests a
negative outcome for the issuer when the issuer’s counsel has
recently represented the underwriter. This raises the possibility of agency problems between the issuer’s counsel, the underwriter, and the issuer.
d. Disclosure
Analysis of the prospectus disclosure provides some insight into one part of the deal for which the lawyers are very
directly responsible, as previously discussed. The content and
impact of different types of disclosure vary, but empirical work
on disclosure agrees that the risk factors have a significant
effect on how a deal is received by investors.171 I therefore
analyze the share of the prospectus for each deal devoted to
risk factors.172
i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
The level of risk factor disclosure provides some evidence
that frequent collaboration between the underwriter and its
counsel yields better team functioning. Each additional deal
that the two parties complete together in the preceding year is
associated with a 30.9% increase in the proportion of the prospectus occupied by risk factors. For repeated deals in the past
two years, the marginal increase is 20.0%, and for three years,
it is 15.0%.173
Although the quantity of disclosure is a rough measure of
how informative disclosure is, it yields some tentative conclusions when viewed in light of the other results. Specifically, a
tion within the past year. The results remain after removing the IPOs from the socalled bubble period, from 1999 to 2000, which were especially prone to litigation.
171
See, e.g., Hanley & Hohberg, supra note 117, at 2821–22 (discussing the
relationship between the degree of disclosure and investors’ perception of the
accuracy of the prospectus).
172
In addition, I analyzed the overall length of prospectuses and the proportion of each devoted to the management’s discussion and analysis section
(“MD&A”) which is also reported to be important in the marketing effort. See
Interview with W, supra note 55. Neither prospectus length nor MD&A proportion
bore a significant relationship to repeated interaction, and so those results are not
reported.
173
See Appendix Table 10. Each estimate is significant at the 0.1% level
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tentative inference can be drawn that the increase in risk factors is a beneficial outcome for the underwriter, especially if it
is not associated with any great litigation risk or risk due to
underlying factors specific to the issuing company. The increased risk factor disclosure might put downward pressure on
the initial filing range or the final price, because it adds to
investor uncertainty about the issuing company. This would,
on balance, benefit the underwriter who stands to lose less and
gain more from underpricing.
ii. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
Repeated interactions between the two sets of counsel are
associated with a trend of marginally increasing risk factor
disclosure, similar to that seen with respect to the underwriter
and its counsel alone. The degree by which risk factor disclosure increases remains relatively constant regardless of
whether prior repeated interactions took place in the past one
year (19.0%), two years (17.3%), or three years (15.1%).174 It is
not clear from this analysis alone whether the pattern reveals
an outcome that is more favorable to the issuer or the underwriter. However, given the relatively modest levels of underpricing and negative probability of litigation associated with the
two sets of counsel’s interactions, the increase in negative disclosure does not seem particularly troublesome for the issuer,
and may actually indicate a good working dynamic between the
two sets of counsel.
iii. Issuer’s Counsel Interactions with the
Underwriter
With respect to issuer’s counsel that have repeatedly faced
the same underwriter across the table, repeated interactions
are associated with much more risk factor disclosure. Each
additional deal together within the preceding one year is associated with a 43.7% increase in the proportion of the prospectus occupied by risk factors. For repeated deals in the past two
years, the marginal increase is 34.2%, and for three years, it is
32.1%.175 An analysis of disclosure when issuer’s counsel has
recently represented the underwriter shows a striking increase
in the proportion of risk factor disclosure: an increase of
128.1% when issuer’s counsel has represented the underwriter
174
175

See Appendix Table 11. Each estimate is significant at the 0.1% level.
See Appendix Table 12. Each estimate is significant at the 0.1% level.
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within the past year.176 This further supports the conclusion
that, regardless of the precise reasons, the result is bad for the
issuer.
There are a few plausible interpretations of these results.
One interpretation is that the issuer’s counsel is trying to protect the issuer from litigation risk, and therefore allowing or
even insisting on high levels of risk disclosure. However, the
result could also be a sign of high levels of deference to the
underwriter without regard to any detrimental impact on the
issuer. As previously explained, issuers tend to resist risk factor disclosure, and one job of the issuer’s counsel is to convince
the issuer to accept language that is necessary, and to negotiate with the underwriter and its counsel to exclude risk factors
that are not necessary. Whichever interpretation is correct,
however, these results, taken together with the results from the
preceding sections, point to worse outcomes for issuers when
repeated interactions increase. Given the negative effect that
risk factors have on underpricing, and given the apparent lack
of protection these risk factors are affording the issuers against
litigation, the increase in negative disclosure seems to be a
negative outcome for the issuing company. And although a
large amount of risk disclosure may indicate a fundamentally
risky company, underlying company risk alone would not explain why repeated interactions among lawyers and bankers
result in incremental increases in risk disclosure over successive unrelated deals. Nonetheless, this conclusion is at best
tentative and must be taken with caution, given the inherent
ambiguity of the risk disclosure as a measure of deal
performance.
e. Time to Completion as a Measure of Efficiency
One way to assess efficiency is by measuring the speed at
which familiar parties complete deals. To do this, I analyze the
length of time it takes to complete a deal from the date that the
Form S-1 (or its equivalent) is filed with the SEC to the offer
date, when the issuer officially goes public. This time period
represents only a portion of the time it takes to complete an
entire deal, because much of the work is done before the S-1 is
filed. Nonetheless, it serves as a proxy for speed and efficiency.
Because the timing of the deal may depend on market conditions in a relatively narrow stretch of time leading up to the
offering, I use a fixed effect for each quarter of the IPO year, in
176
See Appendix Table 13. Results for share of the prospectus devoted to
MD&A were not significant and not reported.
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addition to the fixed effect for the entire year. The data reveals
that the number of lead underwriters or joint bookrunners in
the deal has a significant impact on how long the deal takes to
complete (each additional manager increases the deal length by
approximately six days), and therefore the number of lead underwriters is added to the group of controls. I limit the analysis
to deals that are completed within one year, due to the presence of a number of lengthy deals in the dataset occurring
mainly during the time of the financial crisis in 2008. Removing all deals that take longer than one year lowers the chances
of skewing the results or overstating the true effect of repeated
interactions.
i. Underwriter and Underwriter’s Counsel
For each repeated interaction between the underwriter and
its counsel within the past year, the time between the filing of
the S-1 and the completion of the deal goes down by almost two
days. This means that the deals get completed, on average, at
least two days faster. When only deals for which specific individual lawyers can be identified are analyzed, deals are completed between three and five days faster for each prior deal in
the past year. The results are necessarily incomplete, because
I do not observe the timeframe of the deal from the time before
the S-1 is filed, and therefore I can only analyze some of the
variation in time and efficiency.177 Nonetheless, the systematic
reduction in the length of time to completion of the S-1 provides evidence of a significant increase in efficiency related to
repeated interaction and familiarity with the individuals involved. This effect fades slightly in both magnitude and significance for repeated interactions within two and three years. In
general, however, the trend supports what theory would expect: that better teamwork produces faster results.
ii. Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
No significant reduction in time to completion is evident
from the data when law firms encounter each other repeatedly.
This is surprising, given that one would expect familiarity to
facilitate a more efficient process. However, the length of time a
177
For instance, it is possible that repeated interactions slow the deal down
between the time the deal commences and the filing of the S-1; or it is possible
that repeated interactions speed the deal up by more than two days. While the
analysis reported here does not definitively reveal which is the case, the pattern
observed in the regression models supports what lawyers and bankers report in
interviews: that repeated interactions lead to faster deals.
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deal takes may be affected by many factors outside the lawyers’
control. The timing of the deal is usually managed by the underwriters, and so perhaps it should not be surprising that
familiarity between counsel alone would not affect it. The lack
of a significant result with respect to firm interactions may be
due to noise in the data, or it could be the case that individuals
do not interact as frequently even when the same firms encounter each other repeatedly.
iii. Issuer’s Counsel Interactions with the
Underwriter
The analysis reveals no significant relationship with regard
to issuer’s counsel’s prior representations and the length of
time to market at the firm level.178 When individual lawyers
are analyzed, there is a notable reduction in time to completion. This effect exists, however, only for deals that drag on
longer than one year between the S-1 filing and the offering
date—an extremely long time period for an IPO. When deals
that take less than one year are examined, the effect disappears. It is not clear why this would be the case—it could be
increased efficiency, or could be something specific about the
nature of deals that take an unusually long time. It is therefore
difficult to draw conclusions from this result.
2. Causation Analysis
It would be dangerous to conclude from naı̈ve regressions
alone that a causal relationship exists between repeated interactions and the various outcome variables analyzed. It could
be the case, for instance, that some other underlying factor is
driving the results as well as the observed repeated interactions. Before proceeding to analyze the implications of the findings above, further analysis of identification and alternative
interpretations of the results are warranted.
An inference of causation with respect to the results above
would need to rely on the ability to treat the identities of the
issuer’s counsel and underwriters in each particular deal as
quasi-random. This does not suggest that the dealmakers
need be completely randomly chosen (which would, of course,
be unrealistic). But the inference assumes that repeated observations of lawyers and underwriters working together (or
across the table from one another) are not the result of the
same factors that drive the outcomes being measured, and
178

See Appendix Table 5, Panel D1.
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thus the incidence of dealmakers encountering each other repeatedly are random with respect to the outcomes.
In this regard, one might be very worried about the possibility of selection driving the results. However, there are compelling reasons to rule out selection here. The first is that the
underwriter does not choose the issuer’s counsel or vice versa.
Although there are reports of instances in which the issuer’s
counsel helps to select the underwriter, the practice is not
widespread in IPOs. In many cases, the issuer’s IPO counsel is
chosen at around the same time or after the underwriter is
chosen. If the issuer’s counsel does help choose the underwriter, it is from a short list already determined by the issuer’s
management, and so counsel has a limited role in influencing
the decision.
It is important to note that, although the underwriter does
not choose the issuer’s counsel, there are instances in which
the issuer’s management asks the underwriter for suggestions.
In such instances, by all accounts, the underwriters provide a
list for the issuer’s management to choose from. Such cases
reportedly happen in a minority of deals. And while creating a
short list may give the underwriter some influence over the
selection of counsel, the underwriter still does not ultimately
control the identity of the issuer’s counsel.
There may, of course, be other parties or factors at work
determining both the identity of the issuer’s counsel and the
IPO outcomes analyzed above that could be problematic for
treating the variation in the identity of the deal team as plausibly random. In addition to the lead underwriter, venture capital investors are another set of actors who are reportedly
influential in the selection of counsel in some IPOs. Venture
capitalists typically invest in new companies, and sometimes
provide advice to company management on matters including
the selection of counsel. To control for the possibility that venture capital involvement might be driving the results, I create a
dummy variable to distinguish IPOs in which venture capitalists are involved and ones one where they are not. If venture
capitalists are a source of selection, the results should disappear when this variable is introduced, but the results remain. I
also control the age of each IPO firm, using the natural log of
company ages, to account for the fact that many venturebacked firms are relatively younger companies.
Law firm experience and reputation are also possible to
confound for several reasons. It could be the case that firm
experience would give rise to the same types of results seen
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above, and that one would expect to see with good team dynamics. It could also be the case that firm reputation drives
the results through a signaling mechanism, conveying quality
or lack thereof to the market or to potential litigants. Reputation, experience, and prior relationships with clients may also
cut against the premise of quasi-random assignment. Interviews suggest that issuers’ and underwriters’ choice of law firm
is often based on either a previous relationship or recent experience doing IPOs in a given industry.179
With respect to law firm recent experience and reputation, I
employ several strategies to rule these out as confounding factors. In order to rule out the possibility that law firm quality or
experience is driving the results, I construct variables to represent the number of deals each firm has done in the previous
one year, two years, and three years in each industry, and
overall. When these variables are added to the model, they do
not change the results at all. As a further test of robustness, I
perform the same test but use law firm market share in the
previous year as a measure of experience and reputation. This
variable similarly does not change the results. In addition, I
add fixed effects for certain law firms that appear most frequently in the dataset, and the results remain.180 I perform
similar checks with respect to underwriters, using variables to
account for underwriter experience and market share. Again,
the results remain.
Trends related to the issuing company’s industry, its size,
and the time period in which the IPO took place might all factor
into the same issuer’s counsel and underwriter encountering
each other in multiple deals in a given time period.181 At the
same time, these factors could influence the outcomes being
studied here without regard to the effect of repeated interaction. I employ a number of strategies to rule out the impact of
these factors as drivers of the results. The most basic strategies for doing this, as already described, are the use of fixed
effects for year and industry, and the interaction of the two.182
179

See Interview with W, supra note 55.
In particular, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati appears a disproportionality high number of times on the dataset. Adding a fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini
does not change the results. See Appendix Tables 7 and 8.
181
See Interview with W, supra note 55; see also Barondes et al., supra note
27, at 184–85.
182
The interaction of the year and industry acts as a fixed effect for all deals in
a particular industry in a given year. For example, if all technology IPOs in 1999
suffered from a very high level of underpricing, the interaction of the industry and
year fixed effects will control for that trend.
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In addition to the basic approach, in alternative specifications I
use fixed effects for each lead underwriter and the quarter of
the year in which an IPO occurs. Both of those variables interacted with the industry of the issuing company. In addition, I
use controls for geographic location of the law firms, the fees
charged by each law firm for each deal, the interaction of location and industry of the issuer, and the existence or absence of
outside financing (from venture capital or other sources). I also
include controls for the portion of the IPO proceeds that go to
insiders, and the portion that go to company itself.
With respect to prior relationships between the banks and
the law firms, I construct proxies for bank-lawyer relationships, and remove observations that result from these prior
relationships. I do this in two ways. First, I remove observations for lawyers and banks that are anecdotally reported to
have strong prior relationships. Second, I remove observations
for bank-lawyer pairs with the most frequent interactions as
determined by the data. In both cases, the results remain.
Moreover, I account for anomalous time periods in the dataset.
The years 1999 and 2000 have especially high numbers of IPOs
(as well as repeated interactions) and are associated with very
high levels of underpricing and litigation. I use fixed effects for
these years to remove their average impact on the outcomes,
and in alternative specifications I remove all deals done in each
of these years from the data set completely.183 In each case,
the analysis yields results consistent with my preferred
specification.
Other factors that might impact the issuer’s choice of
counsel as well as the outcome variables are the quality of the
issuing company and the sophistication of the issuing company’s management. Factors that serve as proxies for quality
and sophistication are the age of the company (which impacts
the amount of information available about the company), the
value of the company in terms of total assets, the value of the
company as determined by book value per share, and the size
of the underwriting syndicate.184 Including these factors in the
model yields results consistent with those in the preferred
specification.185
Furthermore, the systematic incremental nature of the results makes it unlikely that underlying factors are driving the
183

See Appendix Tables 7 and 8.
Deal size, measured by the log of gross proceeds, is a standard control in
all specifications. See HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 13, at 263–80.
185
See Appendix Tables 7 and 8.
184
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selection of counsel as well as the outcomes of interest once
time period, market conditions, and industry are controlled for.
In order for underlying factors to be driving the selection of
counsel as well as the results, it would have to be true that the
lawyers are being selected based on very accurate predictions
of the future levels of, say, underpricing and litigation, and that
such levels were being used to select counsel based on the
precise number of times a bank had worked with them (or
across the table from them) a specific number of times. For
example, it would have to be true, on average, that Credit
Suisse predicts 40% underpricing and so picks a law firm it has
worked with exactly three times in the past year; but a 60%
predicted level of underpricing would require it to pick a different law firm that it had worked with exactly four times in the
past year. That scenario is not only extremely unlikely as a
matter of intuition, it contradicts the accounts of bankers and
lawyers describing how the selection of counsel works.
In sum, the results rely on very reasonable assumptions
and are extremely robust to numerous tests, adding controls
and cutting the data to remove observations that could be the
result of selection. The remaining data is the result of plausibly
random variation, and support an inference of causation.
B. Practitioner Experience and Team Dynamics
The practitioner accounts gathered for this Article provide
valuable context for the quantitative results above. While the
lawyers do not see a direct connection between what they do
and the quantitative outcomes of the deals (and are generally
surprised that there is any correlation), their experiences point
to a similar pattern of contrasts between positive and potentially negative consequences of team interaction in IPOs.
Lawyers who work on IPOs report that they regularly come
across familiar counsel and underwriters on different deals.186
Their experiences illustrate how frequent interactions can foster better deal outcomes by building mutual understanding,
186
This impression is confirmed by the quantitative data. Between 1996 and
2010, the same law firm and lead underwriter(s) worked across the table from one
another multiple times in the same year on 450 occasions, out of 2,265 total
deals. Between 1996 and 2010, there were 406 instances in which issuer’s counsel had acted as underwriter’s counsel for the same underwriter within the previous year. On 206 of those occasions, the issuer’s counsel had also worked across
the table from lead underwriter more than one time in the past year, out of a total
of 2,265 deals. Between 1996 and 2010, 454 IPO deals featured law firms that
had worked across the table from one another in an IPO deal at least three times
within the preceding two years.
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coordination, and trust.187 Lawyers frequently report the experience of working on an IPO as one in which all members of the
deal team feel that they are working toward a common goal, an
important primary condition for effective team dynamics.188
Lawyers report that when they are working with an institutional client they have worked with before, the process runs
more smoothly.189 The lawyers understand the organization
and how it operates,190 the key personnel concerned with various issues,191 communication norms,192 and both institutional
and individual preferences with regard to the deal.193 For example, one in-house lawyer taking his company public recounts that during negotiations, the underwriter’s counsel
with whom the underwriter had worked frequently regularly
expressed confidence about what his client would or would not
agree to, without any need to confer with anyone from the
bank’s team.194 This sort of understanding leads in turn to
better coordination, and better alignment of agents and principals in the performance of their tasks. The lawyer needs less
time to gather information about the client’s interests and can
negotiate on the client’s behalf more effectively.
In addition, assuming previous deals have gone well, more
familiarity creates more trust in what the lawyers are doing.195
This in turn frees the bank personnel to focus on marketing
and other commercial aspects of the deal. In some instances,
lawyers are reportedly so familiar with the client and the transactions they do that they become involved in business strategy,
counseling their clients on decisions for which investment
bankers typically do not seek a lawyer’s advice.196
The lawyers interviewed see less downside to teamwork,
although they acknowledged the possibility of too much trust
or deference to the underwriter. As one lawyer described, when
drafting the prospectus as issuer’s counsel, it is common to
187

See Interview with K, supra note 86.
See Hackman, supra note 22, at 249–50.
189
There was a consensus among lawyers’ interviews that this was the case.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney (L) (name withheld by request) (Nov.
10, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with L].
190
Interview with D, supra note 39.
191
See id.
192
Interview with F, supra note 115.
193
Id. As one lawyer in a large capital markets practice described, “I know
exactly who to e-mail or call if I need something, or who to prod if something needs
to get done.” Interview with K, supra note 86.
194
Interview with L, supra note 189.
195
Interview with D, supra note 39.
196
Id.
188
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afford the underwriter great weight in driving much of the content of the disclosure, identifying the precedents to use, and
often reigning in what issuers want to say about themselves.197
Too much deference can undermine the issuer’s interests,
even if their desires are justified. For example, according to
one anecdote, in the course of a drafting session, a negotiation
commenced over the inclusion of a disclosure that issuer did
not want to include.198 Having no particular expertise, the
issuer’s management deferred to counsel.199 The issuer’s
counsel argued for its exclusion because it was not material
but might nonetheless provide an unnecessary roadmap to litigation.200 The underwriter and its counsel were insistent, and
the issuer’s lawyer conceded the point.201 This example illustrates how issuer’s counsel may be reluctant to disrupt the
good working relationship of the group, even if it might be bad
for the client’s long-term interests.
One lawyer described a particularly unpleasant deal
marked by poor teamwork. In that deal, the lawyers representing the issuer had not done many IPOs, and were in fact typically M&A lawyers, and took what was described as a more
adversarial stance. The interviewee recounted how the lawyers
refused to “reign in” the issuer’s management on certain requests, turned everything into a laborious negotiation, and
blamed the delays on the underwriter’s counsel.202 Despite the
lack of teamwork, the issuer was able to get more of what it
wanted than would typically be the case.
IV
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The findings above indicate that teamwork is a doubleedged sword. The frequency of principal-agent interactions
plays a significant role in augmenting the quality of an IPO
deal; however, there is also evidence that repeated interaction
between lawyers and underwriting investment banks magnifies
agency costs between the issuer and the underwriter, as well as
the issuer and its own counsel.
197

Interview with L, supra note 189.
Telephone Interview with Attorney (C) (name withheld by request) (June 21,
2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with C].
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Interview with W, supra note 55.
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Though the data support the general conclusion about the
benefits and pitfalls of teamwork, they do not reveal the precise
mechanism. The most plausible mechanism would be indirect.
Legal counsel influence deals through their advice and their
impact on disclosure, but they typically do not engage directly
in negotiations related to pricing and other commercial aspects
of the deal. On the positive side, this means that good group
dynamics can increase the ability of every member of the group
to perform tasks more effectively. For example, if counsel
works well with the underwriters, they can focus less on regulatory matters and spend more time on marketing and other
commercial aspects of the transaction. If the lawyers do a better job writing disclosure, it helps investors to understand the
company, generating more interest and making it easier for the
investment banks to sell the issuer’s shares.
Nonetheless, the most plausible mechanism for the results
above also implicates the tension between the lawyer’s agency
role and the group dynamic of the deals. The components of
this mechanism range from the benign to the pernicious. On
the more benign end of the spectrum, it could be the case that a
better team dynamic entrenches a common idea about the nature of the team’s goals in an IPO, such that it conceals the
ways in which the parties’ interests diverge. This can be described as the common knowledge effect: a feature of group
dynamics in which information and ideas held by the most
group members (the things that “everybody knows”) have disproportionate influence on group judgments to the exclusion of
new information.203 The entrenched goals and norms are developed through repeated interactions over time until alternatives seem outlandish.
Moreover, the perceived goals of the deal, as well as the
group ideas about the optimal outcome of the deal, are driven
by the underwriters—the repeat actors with the most at stake
in shaping those goals.204 After numerous interactions, the
goals of the transaction as expressed by the underwriting bank
come to be taken for granted by the issuer’s counsel and underwriter’s counsel alike, and they in turn convince the issuers
accordingly. In such situations, it is often difficult for a relatively new member of a group, such as the issuer’s management, to express dissent. The issuer in an IPO may not see the
203
See Daniel Gigone & Reid Hastie, The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and Group Judgment, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 959, 959–74
(1993).
204
Cf. SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 83, at 15.
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utility of fighting what the rest of the group sees as market
norms, and counsel are unable to advise them otherwise.205
An even more pernicious possibility is that the issuer’s counsel
is overly solicitous of the underwriter’s preferences and perspective on how the deal should run, in the hope of currying
favor and future business.206 If the issuer’s management is not
experienced in capital markets work, they rely heavily on their
lawyers both for advice and as examples of how to interact with
underwriters, how to negotiate, and how much deference to
afford to the underwriters’ expertise. In many instances,
outside funders such as venture capital groups may be involved in some of the deal negotiations. Although the data do
not reveal any significant differences in the patterns when
outside funders are present in a deal, it is possible they might
also influence any negotiations with underwriters. Nonetheless, they are also subject to the common knowledge effect, and
more importantly, their interests are also often not perfectly
aligned with the long-term interests of the issuers. For example, outside funders are typically subject to lockup provisions,
and therefore they usually cannot sell their stake until several
months after the IPO.207 This means, however, that they stand
to benefit from underpricing as well, but may have less of a
long-term stake in the company once the lockup agreements
expire.208 Nonetheless, the managers of a small venturebacked firm are unlikely to challenge their outside backers,
especially if all the other parties in the deal are giving similar
advice in lockstep.
Agency costs could arise in one or a combination of these
scenarios in a deal team. Whichever of these possibilities explain the precise dynamics at work, the overall conclusion remains that agency costs arise in teamwork, and indeed agency
205
The social psychology literature notes that majorities tend to silence minority opinions, especially opinions from a party not previously part of the group,
because minorities do not want to lose the favor of the majority. See Robert S.
Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion Extremity, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 537, 557–59 (1996). This may explain why the managers of issuing
companies concede to underpricing so pliantly.
206
This is also analogous to regulatory capture, or what some scholars refer to
as “deep capture.” See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 202–06 (2003).
207
See Interview with W, supra note 55.
208
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 622. This was an issue in the eToys case as
well. When the lockups expired several months after the IPO, venture capital
investors dumped their stock in order to realize their profit. This resulted in the
price of the stock dropping. See Laura Casares Field & Gordon Hanka, The
Expiration of IPO Share Lockups, 56 J. FIN. 471, 474 (2001).
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costs are exacerbated by the same kinds of group interaction
that are thought to produce better teamwork. These agency
costs arise along three dimensions: the relationship between
the issuing company and the underwriters, the relationship
between the issuing company and its counsel, and the relationship between the issuing company’s management and the company itself as an entity.209 Below, I describe how the law
surrounding each of these relationships is impacted.210
A. “Arm’s Length” Transactions and Team Dynamics
If teamwork enhances agency costs between the issuer and
the underwriter, as well as the issuer and its counsel, then
many capital markets transactions are less “arm’s length” than
courts have previously assumed. This is important because in
recent years, courts have increasingly been asked to decide
whether underwriters have any fiduciary duty to issuers when
it comes to getting the best price for securities in the market.211
Fiduciary relationships exist to minimize agency costs
while preserving the benefits of agency.212 They do so by imposing on an agent “a duty to act for or to give advice for the
benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation.”213 In arm’s length dealings, by contrast, the law
presumes that parties to a transaction are capable of looking
after their own interests, and (absent outright fraud) are not
entitled to rely on the trustworthiness of their counterparts.
209
A number of the lawyers interviewed noted that the issuing company is the
ultimate client. See, e.g., Interview with W, supra note 55.
210
I note that the law’s treatment of each of these relationships could be
explored in great depth. However, in order to maintain the focus of this paper, I
will describe them in relatively broad terms and save deeper analysis for future
work.
211
See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Bos. (USA) Inc., 399 F.
Supp. 2d 375, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Breakaway Solutions, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., No. Civ.A. 19522-NC, 2005 WL 3488497, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2005) (“To
the extent that underwriters function, among other things, as expert advisors to
their clients on market conditions, a fiduciary duty may exist.”); Jorling v. Anthem, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 821, 834–35 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (finding no fiduciary
duty between an underwriter and issuer with respect to advice on size and price of
an IPO); EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 92, 96–97 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2011) (finding that no fiduciary duty arose between an underwriter and
issuer); HF Mgmt. Servs. LLC v. Pistone, 818 N.Y.S.2d 40, 42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(“New York . . . does not recognize the existence of a fiduciary obligation that is
based solely on the relationship between an underwriter and issuer.”). For an
analysis of investment bank fiduciary duties, primarily in the context of merger
and acquisition transactions, see generally Andrew Tuch, Investment Banks as
Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest, 29 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 478,
478–517 (2005).
212
See SITKOFF, supra note 67, at 198–99.
213
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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The existence of a fiduciary duty matters legally as well as
practically, because parties will negotiate differently if they believe the other side has their best interests in mind than they
will if they believe the other side to be adverse.
While courts recognize that underwriters have interests
that are clearly adverse to the issuer’s,214 they also recognize
that the underwriter acts in an advisory capacity to the issuer,215 and therefore a fiduciary duty may arise—even when it
is disclaimed by contract—if the course of dealing between the
parties suggests a relationship of trust and reliance.216 Despite the theoretical possibility, courts addressing the issue
have typically declined to find that a fiduciary duty exists between underwriters and issuers with respect to pricing an
IPO.217
In determining whether such a relationship exists between
issuers and underwriters,218 courts have assumed that: (1) issuers are sophisticated parties219 who are (2) advised by experienced counsel,220 and (3) should be able to recognize when a
214
See, e.g., HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (“In fact, not only is a
fiduciary aspect absent from the majority of underwriting relationships, such
relationships are better characterized as adversarial since the statutorily-imposed
duty of underwriters is to investors.”).
215
See, e.g., Xpedior Creditor Trust, 399 F. Supp. 2d at 382 (“[A]n advisor and
underwriter to [the issuer] had a fiduciary duty ‘to refrain from doing any act
injurious to [the issuer], or which would deprive [the issuer] of any profit or
advantage.’”); see also EBC I, Inc., v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 32
(N.Y. 2005) (“We stress . . . that the fiduciary duty we recognize is limited to the
underwriter’s role as advisor.”).
216
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. b (“[L]iability is not dependent solely upon an agreement or contractual relation between the fiduciary and
the beneficiary but results from the relation.”); see also EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at
31 (finding that an issuer’s reliance on the advice and expertise of its underwriter
could create a relationship of “higher trust” and result in the underwriter having a
fiduciary obligation to the issuer); Greene v. Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447 (N.Y. 1979).
217
See, e.g., EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 92, 96–97
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011); HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
218
See, e.g., EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at 31–32 (finding that a fiduciary relationship can arise). The precise legal issue with which courts grapple in these cases is
whether or not the plaintiffs present issues of fact sufficient to survive summary
judgment regarding the establishment of a fiduciary duty; the determination
turns upon whether the circumstances of an underwriting relationship between
sophisticated parties with experienced counsel can, in any circumstances, create
such a relationship. See, e.g., id. For the sake of clarity, I do not discuss in detail
the legal posture of these cases, which is unnecessary to the basic point.
219
See, e.g., id. at 35–36 (Read, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that no set of
facts can establish a fiduciary relationship when the issuer is a “sophisticated,
well-counseled business entity”).
220
See id. at 36 (noting that the offering price was “negotiated by sophisticated, represented parties”); HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (“Both parties
were separately counseled. In fact, the underwriting agreement specifically iden-
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deal is adversarial and when it is not.221 Each of these assumptions appears less compelling in light of the data on IPOs
for the reasons that follow.
1. Issuer Sophistication
Courts that declare issuers to be sophisticated commercial
entities are certainly correct, but they overlook the fact that
people can be sophisticated with respect to one area of commercial life but nonetheless be susceptible to the influence of
advisors in the right context. Managers of companies going
public often have little experience in capital markets transactions, and although they may be sophisticated with respect to
business, they rely heavily on the underwriter, legal counsel,
and outside funders if there are any, to inform them of the
norms and “market” practices, and guide them through the
process.222 While this can happen outside of group or team
dealmaking, a group dynamic in which everyone appears to be
working toward the issuer’s interests can make it more difficult
for a company’s management to realize that their interests may
be adverse from those of underwriters. And, in any event, even
sophisticated parties can succumb to groupthink or be persuaded by the dictates of purported “market standards.”223
When dealing with a cohesive team of advisors, all of whom the
tified EBG as the ‘special regulatory counsel for the underwriters’ and acknowledged that another law firm was serving as outside counsel for WellCare.”).
221
See, e.g., EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at 36 (comparing the issuer and the
underwriter to a buyer and seller, and noting that “the [arm’s length] nature of the
contractual relationship between an issuer and an underwriter is long-established and well-understood”); HF Mgmt. Servs., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (noting the
“long-established and well-understood” nature of the relationship between underwriter and issuer (quoting EBC I, Inc., 832 N.E.2d at 36)).
222
See Interview with W, supra note 55; see also Schneider et al., supra note
24, at 2 (discussing the importance of counsel and investment banks in advising
the issuer). Issuers are also sometimes advised by venture capital firms that back
them and who can provide greater levels of sophistication. However, the venture
capitalists who back issuing companies vary in terms of the degree of involvement
they take. Often, they invest in numerous companies and do not get heavily
involved in the IPO itself. See Interview with W, supra note 55. The venture
capital investors also have interests that are aligned in many ways with the
underwriters, because they are usually subject to lock-up agreements limiting
their ability to sell shares for several months after the offering, meaning that they
will personally benefit from any underpricing when they exit the company. See
Jan Jindra & Dima Leshchinskii, Venture Capital Valuation, Partial Adjustment,
and Underpricing: Behavioral Bias or Information Production?, 50 FIN. REV. 173,
186–87 (2015).
223
See JANIS, supra note 82, at 7–9 (2d ed. 1982) (describing the theory that
groups converge on common ideas that are not always correct); see also Heath &
Gonzales, supra note 82, at 305–26 (discussing evidence of poor decision making
based on group dynamics).
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issuer presumes to be working in its interests, the lack of issuer sophistication is an even greater liability because managers will be less likely to oppose the group majority’s views
without reliable advice to back them up.224
2. Advice of Counsel
Both the theory and evidence discussed in preceding sections suggest that issuers cannot always rely on their counsel
to advocate forcefully for them or even recognize that such an
adversarial posture is appropriate when dealmaking takes on a
team-like dynamic. The pattern seen in the quantitative results gives ample reason to doubt that the presence of sophisticated counsel warrants the assumptions that issuers are
always apprised of the extent to which its interests diverge from
those of the underwriter supposedly in its service. Given the
nature of a team-like IPO deal process, this could happen for a
number of reasons. The issuer’s counsel can succumb to
groupthink as easily as any party, especially if the particular
lawyers involved have worked with certain members of the
group repeatedly in the past.225 The issuer’s lawyers may not
notice that the issuer’s and underwriter’s interests are adverse;
or even if the lawyers do notice, they may be reluctant to take
actions that might disrupt the smooth group dynamic. More
subtly, counsel may establish patterns of deference to underwriters in order to aid the team dynamic that also have the
effect of minimizing dissent. In any scenario, a well-working
group dynamic among the issuer’s advisors can backfire on the
issuer and undermines the assumption that “counseled” parties can be characterized as dealing at arm’s length.
3. Recognizing Adverse Interests
The adversarial nature of the parties’ interest in an IPO is
less clear than courts assume, given the team-like framework
and presumption of a common goal. The terms of the underwriters’ compensation structure—a percentage of the proceeds
of the offering—contribute to the impression that incentives are
aligned, because at a surface level, it appears that the underwriter would want to maximize proceeds as well.226 However,
parties familiar with institutional details of IPOs might recog224

See Baron et al., supra note 205, at 63.
Cf. SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 83, at 15.
226
The eToys case raised this point. See EBC I. Inc., 832 N.E.2d 26 at 32
(“Thus eToys allegedly believed its interests and those of Goldman Sachs were
aligned: the higher the price, the higher Goldman Sachs’ 7% profit.”).
225
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nize how incentives diverge, but as just discussed, groupthink,
lack of awareness, and lack of incentive make it difficult for
issuer’s counsel to advise the issuers properly on these matters. And if issuer’s counsel cannot or will not effectively distinguish the adversarial from nonadversarial elements of an
IPO, then the less-experienced issuer has little hope of doing so
in most cases.
4. A Fiduciary Duty for the Underwriter?
Courts that have wrestled with the fiduciary duty question
may reconsider their views in light of the pattern described
above. The eToys case provides an illustration. Before the
eToys case eventually settled in 2013, a divided appellate division panel ruled that Goldman owed no fiduciary duty to eToys
in the underwriting process, and therefore had no obligation to
help it capture all of the value from the deal that it could
have.227 The majority reasoned that, despite the advisory role
an investment bank takes with respect to a company going
public, eToys and Goldman were operating at arm’s length per
the terms of the underwriting agreement between the two
parties.228
The majority noted in passing that eToys’ counsel had been
contemporaneously representing Goldman on another deal
when the eToys IPO began, but dismissed the possibility that
the prior representation would lead to any conflict, noting that
eToys’ firm (the Venture Law Group, or VLG) had properly disclosed the fact and obtained the parties’ consent.229 While
there is no question that the VLG properly waived any potential
conflict,230 the results above indicate that even with proper
waivers, VLG was less likely than other law firms to be in the
best position to help eToys reach independent judgments and
ask the right questions about the advice it was getting from its
underwriter. In a deal framework that resembles a team dynamic where reliance and trust arise naturally, the issuer was
less likely to perceive where its interests diverged from the goal
that the group was pursuing. And the nature of VLG’s past
interactions with Goldman made it highly unlikely that the firm
would be able to assist eToys in getting the best deal. In all
227
See EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 936 N.Y.S.2d 92, 100–01 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2011).
228
See id. at 94–95.
229
See id.
230
The firm had disclosed and obtained consent from the parties to engage in
the representation, per the rules of professional responsibility. See id.
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likelihood, the prevailing social dynamic left the issuer open to
exploitation, even as it assumed that other members of the deal
team were looking out for its interests.
While the results above shed light on how much a “wellcounseled” issuer can be expected to adequately protect its
interests in an IPO, they do not make clear what the solution to
problems should be. The SEC has recognized that conflicts of
interest exist in issuer-underwriter relationships, particularly
where underwriters are engaged in spinning. Spinning is a
practice that underwriters employed to curry favor with the
managers of issuing companies whose IPOs were severely underpriced, by allowing them to invest in other “hot” or underpriced IPOs. If an underwriter underpriced an IPO and the
CEO or other officers of the company became upset, the underwriter would allocate shares of the next underpriced deal, ensuring that the shares would increase in value and make
company officers an instant profit. The SEC, via FINRA,
banned the practice in 2011 after a string of complaints.231
Nonetheless, the conflict of interest at the heart of the spinning
problem still exists, raising questions about the duties that
underwriters owe to issuers in IPOs.
The courts that have addressed this issue have been reluctant to impose any sort of duty, despite recognizing that one
might exist.232 Ultimately, whether such a duty makes sense
and how it might work raises numerous questions, adequate
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article. A categorical fiduciary duty (imposed on all underwriting relationships) would change the nature of underwriting dramatically
and would contravene the issuer’s and underwriter’s ability to
structure their contractual relationships. However, an ad-hoc
finding of a fiduciary relationship in some cases, as has been
suggested by some courts,233 would make it difficult for parties
to predictably structure their relationships, and likely subject
underwriters to increased contracting costs and litigation.234
These are problems with no simple solutions, and would benefit from further research.

231

See FINRA, RULE 5131 (2011).
See, e.g., EBC I, Inc., 936 N.Y.S.2d at 100–01 (refusing to find that the facts
sufficiently established the existence of a fiduciary duty, despite the Court of
Appeals’ insistence that one did).
233
See id.
234
See SITKOFF, supra note 67, at 200 (discussing the problems inherent in
different types of fiduciary duty regimes).
232
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B. Implications for Ethical Rules
When a lawyer’s role as agent comes into tension with a
lawyer’s role as a team member, what implications are there for
lawyers’ ethical rules? Latent conflicts, some of which may not
even enter counsel’s awareness, can exist with regard to his or
her individual clients (the issuing company’s management) as
well as the organizational client (the issuing company itself).
The results previously discussed suggest reexamining the assumptions embodied in the rules about how conflicts are
handled.
1. Conflicts of Interest
Every state has passed an analogue to the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct containing provisions governing
conflicts of interest in representation. Rule 1.7 of the Model
Rules, which principally governs such conflicts, states that a
lawyer may represent a client if the lawyer has no concurrent
conflict of interest.235 A concurrent conflict of interest is defined as one in which representing the interests of one client
“will be directly adverse to another client” or “there is a significant risk that the representation of one [client] . . . will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another
client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest
of the lawyer.”236 Such conflicts, if they exist, are imputed to
the lawyer’s entire firm.237 Of course, potential conflicts arise
all the time among law firms in most major financial centers.
These are typically waived, often prospectively and in a general
manner, as part of a client’s standard retainer agreement.238
The Rules allow for lawyers to obtain a client’s informed consent to continue the representation despite a potential conflict,
provided that the lawyer reasonably believes he or she will be
235

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
Id. r. 1.7(a). The Rule contains slight variations in some states. Most
notably for this Article, New York’s version provides that a conflict exists in a
concurrent representation if a “reasonable lawyer would conclude that either: (1)
the representation will involve the lawyer in representing differing interests; or (2)
there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a
client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property
or other personal interests.” N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (N.Y. CTY. LAW.
ASS’N ETHICS INST. 2011).
237
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 1.
238
See Michael J. DiLernia, Advance Waivers of Conflicts of Interest in Large
Law Firm Practice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97, 97 (2009) (“Advance waivers of
conflicts of interest have become an essential business and ethics practice for
large law firms in the United States.”).
236
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able to provide competent and diligent representation.239 In
addition, to raise an ethical red flag, multiple adverse representations must provide more than the mere possibility of harm to
one client—the harm must be foreseeable and likely.240 In
short, in most jurisdictions, the rules governing conflicts of
interest are fairly permissive as long as counsel obtains informed consent. However, in some states—like New York,
where a large share of capital markets deals are conducted—
lawyers are generally prohibited from placing themselves in a
position in which they advance, or even appear to advance,
interests of a party adverse to those of their client.241
The agency tensions inherent in team-like deals challenge
the ways in which Rule 1.7 has been interpreted to allow client
consent for potential conflicts of interest. First, the idea that a
lawyer can “reasonably believe” that adequate representation of
an issuer is possible when the counsel is currently or has recently represented the same underwriter in the deal is highly
suspect. A lawyer’s ability reasonably to assess his or her susceptibility to bias is inherently suspect. Like most human beings, lawyers can fall prey to overconfidence bias,242 and
239
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b). The rule states that a lawyer may
represent a client despite a concurrent conflict of interest if:
“(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected
client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by
one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the
same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in
writing.”
See id.
240
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 8 (stating that “[t]he mere
possibility of subsequent harm” will not establish a concurrent conflict of
interest).
241
See N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105; see also Greene v.
Greene, 47 N.Y.2d 447, 451 (N.Y. 1979) (“Thus, attorneys historically have been
strictly forbidden from placing themselves in a position where they must advance,
or even appear to advance, conflicting interests . . . . This prohibition was designed to safeguard against not only violation of the duty of loyalty owed the
client, but also against abuse of the adversary system and resulting harm to the
public at large.” (citations omitted)).
242
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b). A large literature has documented overconfidence bias—or a belief in abilities beyond what one realistically
possesses—in business and finance. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 142 (2000) (“[S]ome basic tendency toward overconfidence appears to be a
robust human character trait . . . .”); see also Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 650 (1997) (“Probably far more lawyers pride
themselves on independence and good judgment than consistently exhibit it.”).
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overestimate their ability to represent a party faithfully while
representing an adverse client.243 Research on lawyer recusals
supports the intuition that it is exceedingly rare for lawyers to
inform clients that they are unable to waive a conflict.244
In addition, lawyers serve as their own gatekeepers when
assessing potential conflicts.245 The inquiry into whether the
conflict might result in harm to a client rests entirely with the
“conflicted” attorney, and so will inevitably be subject to any
biases or blind spots the attorney may have. Based on the
interviews and other accounts by lawyers who do capital markets work, it is difficult for an issuer’s counsel to perceive the
danger of prior interactions with underwriters that are apparent from the quantitative data; moreover, even New York’s
stricter conflict of interest rules would permit representation
despite the pattern in outcomes, because they are not obvious
enough to preclude a “reasonable belief” that that diligent representation can be given. Greater awareness of the trends inherent in successive representation could make some
difference if it changes accepted beliefs about what types of
conflicts can be reasonably waived. But it is not clear that this
would be the case. And in a team-like deal, whether
groupthink, overlawyering, or unconscious bias is at work, it
would be hard for lawyers to reliably recognize the danger and
screen.
Second, the rationale for allowing clients to give “informed
consent” to concurrent representation—respect for client autonomy246—makes far less sense if simple disclosure of a potential conflict does not, and cannot, convey all the potential
ways in which loyalty can be undermined. The information
upon which “informed consent” rests is the fact of concurrent
243
In interviews, most lawyers readily acknowledged that issuer’s counsel
frequently pandered to underwriters with whom they had worked; however, all
were firm that they had never fallen into the same trap.
244
See Leonard E. Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney Conflict of Interest Rules Consistent with Principles of Behavioral Economics?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 111, 149 (2006). Professor Gross’s study surveyed graduates of Southern
Illinois University Law School and found that 68% of respondents claimed to
inform their clients that conflicts were nonwaivable less than 10% of the time;
another 15% of respondents stated that they informed their clients that the conflicts were nonwaivable only 25% of the time. See id. at 149; see also Bryan K.
Church & Xi (Jason) Kuang, Conflicts of Interest, Disclosure, and (Costly) Sanctions: Experimental Evidence, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 526–27 (2009).
245
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7, cmt. 1.
246
The rationale for allowing informed consent typically rests on concerns for
client autonomy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 122
cmt. g(iv) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“Concern for client autonomy generally warrants
respecting a client’s informed consent.”).
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representation, but analysis of the data raises doubts that
such information conveys everything that would be relevant for
consent. For the previously discussed reasons, the team-like
dynamic of an IPO deal makes it seem as though prior or even
concurrent representation would not present a problem, and
may even be a benefit, because everyone has the same goals.
However, as discussed in the preceding sections, conflicts may
exist that are not obvious, and that in hindsight would appear
to be subject to truly informed consent.
2. Organizational Representation
This Article has thus far treated issuing companies as
though they are singular clients. However, as in any organization, the picture is more complex. The ultimate client is the
organization itself, but the organization acts through its officers and directors, any of whom may have interests that diverge from what is ultimately best for the company. The group
nature of capital markets deals further complicates this already muddy distinction, and may compromise counsel’s ability to serve their organizational clients.
The Model Rules make clear that when lawyers represent
an organization, their duty runs to the organization itself.247
This implies that good legal advice would include what is best
for the company, even if the company management cannot see
what that would be. The ability to give such advice, however, is
undermined for all the reasons already stated. For instance,
an issue like underpricing may not have a large impact on the
issuer’s management as individuals, because they will frequently be prohibited from selling their shares until months
after the IPO and so will not be adversely affected.248 They
themselves may have also been “spun,” or sold shares in future
hot IPOs lead by the underwriter to soothe any lingering bad
feelings from an underpriced deal.249 However, underpricing is
still a long-term problem for a newly public company because it
has less cash to operate. Acquiescing to underpricing can thus
be understood as an agency problem on multiple levels, meaning that counsel cannot adequately represent the organizational client without advising management about where their
own interests may diverge from those of the company.
A fulsome analysis of this potential problem is beyond the
scope and space limitations of this Article, but it is an issue
247
248
249

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13.
See Griffith, supra note 17, at 609, 636–43.
See id.

R
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that requires further exploration. At a very general level, the
ethics rules should require disclosure of recent representations, as well as the associated unintended consequences. A
solution might also entail barring acting as issuer’s counsel
following multiple deals with the same underwriter in a certain
period of time, akin to the rules mandating the rotation of
auditing partners that came into force in the wake of the corporate accounting scandals in the late 90s and early 2000s.250
Finally, the rules should require counsel to explain to the client
not only the fact of a prior representation but also the ways in
which the parties’ incentives diverge and the possible impact
that could have on the deal. In any event, an explicit recognition of the problem is an important step in prompting the bar to
vigilance.
C. Managing Agency and Teamwork
In addition to the legal and ethical considerations discussed above, it is worth considering practical solutions to address problems inherent in teamwork. The first is that lawyers
should take a larger role in setting the norms of a deal team,
including a norm that provides space for dissent without disrupting the team dynamic.251 The second, ironically, is that
lawyers should revise their view of their own role on a deal team
as more adversarial, or at least critical of the supposed market
standards that prevail. The third is that lawyers should prime
more critical approaches by locating more information.252 I
discuss each of these in more detail here.
One means of managing the tension between agency and
teamwork is to develop a different understanding of the lawyer’s role in the group process of bringing an IPO to market.
Social science research indicates that in a group setting individuals will silence themselves if they think that dissent from
the prevailing norm will lead to punishment or loss of reputation, both of which are dangers for lawyers working with familiar underwriters.253 However, the research also reveals that
the most effective teams require more than just familiarity,
trust, and routinization; they also require a set of norms and
practices for raising problems and resolving disputes, while
250
251
252
253

See
See
See
See

Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A(j), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
Hackman, supra note 22, at 246–55.
Turner & Pratkanis, supra note 82, at 105–08.
SUNSTEIN & HASTIE, supra note 83, at 107.
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maintaining the trust and safety that familiarity affords.254 Indeed, the research shows that teams in which group members
raise conflicts, dissent, or play devil’s advocate perform better
than teams in which conflict is downplayed.255 However, there
is a catch: the conflicts must be raised in a way that maintains
the collaborative ethos of the group, a task that requires good
communication skills and emotional intelligence.256 As both
advisors and process experts, lawyers are particularly well
positioned to suggest group norms that include and even reward dissenting views, in the interest of improving the deal.
Making the expectation clear at the outset of the deal that the
lawyers will actively pursue dissenting viewpoints, while still
working with the team, would lessen the perceived cost of
breaking from the group’s consensus.257
Of course, to do so, issuer’s counsel would need to reframe
its role in the transaction as one consisting of more advocacy.
However, this need not be difficult. Dissent is an advocacytype function that lawyers are ordinarily well trained to perform, and reframing counsel’s role would not be a major departure from what lawyers routinely do. In order to advocate
effectively, a lawyer would need a more complex understanding
of his or her role in the interests of the various parties in the
deal, and the ways in which an issuer might be especially vulnerable. This would mean developing a more nuanced understanding of when critical moments occur in the deal, as well as
what kind of advice to give.
Many of the most critical negotiations in an IPO are
thought to occur at the very end of the deal, when the issuer
and lead underwriter agree on an offering price just before the
stock goes public. But the negotiations preceding pricing have
an impact on a number of factors that are influential in almost
any negotiation: the information available to the parties, the
nature of relationships between the parties (including patterns
of deference), and the alternatives available to the parties. For
example, as previously discussed, certain types of disclosure
254
See Greer et al., supra note 84, at 116; see also Hackman, supra note 22,
at 250, 261.
255
See Greer et al., supra note 84, at 116; see also Garry Emmons, Encouraging Dissent in Decision-Making, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://hbswk.hbs
.edu/item/encouraging-dissent-in-decision-making [http://perma.cc/KV942PW5].
256
See Greer et al., supra note 84, at 116; see also Emmons, supra note 255.
257
For example, in one large consulting firm where team tasks are emphasized, team members are charged with a “duty to dissent” to help avoid
groupthink.
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have a negative effect on initial offer price.258 Moreover, the
preliminary prospectus provides a basis for comparison between the issuer and other companies that have gone public,
which in turn provides an anchor for setting the initial offer
range and the final price.259 Instead of taking cues from the
underwriter, a more proactive issuer’s counsel could help to
establish a better bargaining position for the issuer from the
very beginning of the deal.
Providing effective advice would also involve developing
more information about market norms and performance, independently of what is provided by underwriters and other parties typically involved in such deals. For example, gathering a
broader range of precedent documents or data about market
performance for issuing companies from the outset of a deal
could help to counter groupthink and the psychological weight
of anchoring. If the lawyers have worked frequently with a
particular underwriter, it might be necessary to avoid using
precedent documents from previous deals with the underwriter, or even change personnel from deal to deal. While this
might diminish some efficiency gains, it would likely better
serve issuers in the long run. Whether issuers take such advice or not, greater access to alternative views would help issuers make better decisions regarding their deals, and lawyers
are uniquely placed to help provide this information. Again,
these proposals require more in-depth analysis, but they provide a starting point for further thinking on the issue.
CONCLUSION
Working in teams—both on your own side of a deal and
with those nominally on the other side—is part of the reality of
transactional legal practice. Familiarity and good teamwork
are beneficial, perhaps even essential, but they also carry more
costs for lawyers and their clients than many assume. The goal
of this Article is to reveal those costs, explain the theory and
the evidence for their existence, and discuss how both law and
258
See Khaled Abdou & Mehmet F. Dicle, Do Risk Factors Matter in the IPO
Valuation?, 15 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 63, 66–67 (2007).
259
The anchoring effect is a cognitive bias, described as the formation of a
belief about the value of something, based on a specified initial value, regardless
of whether that initial value is salient or entirely irrelevant. See JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 14 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos
Tversky eds., 1982) (“In many situations, people make estimates by starting from
an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer . . . . [D]ifferent starting
points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values. We
call this phenomenon anchoring.”).
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deal practice should take them into account. In doing so, this
Article does not suggest that teamwork is a bad thing or that it
should be dispensed with. It merely suggests that familiarity,
trust, and the hallmarks of teamwork have especially complicated implications for deal lawyers. There are benefits, but also
costs that must be taken into account. The point is that companies make this cost-benefit analysis without awareness of
the cost of close relationships among the repeat players. The
Article is an effort to bring those to light so that companies can
become aware of them, as can courts and practitioners.
The secondary goal of this Article is to dispel the myth in
legal practice, as has been done in other spheres, that good
relationships alone are enough for effective collaboration, and
that effective teamwork is something that arises through repetition. While those things are important elements to a good
working dynamic, it is essential for lawyers, even more than for
those in other professions, to develop the ability to recognize
conflict, dissent, and object, but do so in a way that preserves
the positive ethos of the working group. This is not something
that develops automatically, but it is a skill to which lawyers
are well suited, and indeed they should employ if they wish to
balance the tension between agency and teamwork. Though
teamwork is a popular topic, discussions of how to leverage it
properly and avoid its pitfalls are virtually absent from discussions of good lawyering. Nonetheless, if lawyers are to continue
to be effective transaction cost engineers in capital markets,
these conversations are important, and the skills that come
with them are essential, particularly at a time when the value
of legal education is in question and large corporate clients
complain that lawyers lack the ability to add value.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX FIGURE 1. VARIABLES ANALYZED AND STANDARD
CONTROLS USED FOR OLS AND PROBIT MODELS.
Outcome variables Main independent
tested (dependent variables: Types of
variables)
lawyer interactions
tested
(IPOs together
within the preceding
1 year, 2 years, and
3 years)
• First trading day
price change

• Lead underwriter
and underwriter’s
counsel

• Price change
relative to the S&P • Lead underwriter
Index at 30 days,
and the issuer’s
60 days, 90 days,
counsel (prior
and 1 year post
interactions
offering
across the table)
• Probability of
correct upward
price revision

• Lead underwriter
and the issuer’s
counsel as
underwriter’s
• Probability of
counsel (potential
securities class
“conflict” deals:
action litigation at
prior interactions
6 months and 1
on the same side
year post offering
of the table)
• Prospectus size
(as the log of
prospectus size
• Proportion of
prospectus
devoted to risk
factors

• Issuer’s counsel
and underwriter’s
counsel (prior
interactions
across the table)

Additional control variables

• Offering size (as the log of gross
proceeds)
• IPO year and quarter fixed effects (a
dummy variable for each year and
quarter year in the sample)
• IPO industry fixed effects (a dummy
variable for each industry in the
sample, using the SEC’s 3-digit SIC
codes; Fama French industry
classification codes used in alternative
specifications)
• Underwriting bank fixed effects (a
dummy variable for each lead
underwriting bank, de-weighted in the
case of multiple lead underwriters)
• Age of the issuer (as the log of the
issuer’s age)
• Lead underwriter quality (according to
number of IPOs performed –
robustness checks done using samples
of the seven most experienced banks
and the fourteen most experienced
banks)

• Proportion of
prospectus
devoted to MD&A

• Lead underwriter quality (by IPO
market share for the preceding
calendar year)

• Length of time
from the filing of
Form S-1 to the
offer date

• Law firm experience/quality (as the
number of IPO deals completed by
each law firm in the preceding 1-year,
2-year and 3-year periods)

• Volatility relative
to the S&P Index
at 30 days, 60
days, 90 days,
and 1 year post
offering

• Law firm experience/quality (by IPO
market share for the preceding
calendar year)
• Geographic location of law firms (by
ZIP code and city)
• Participation by venture capital
investors (a dummy variable indicating
the involvement of venture capital
investors prior to the IPO).
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APPENDIX FIGURE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS.
N*
Mean Median
2,265
268
1.40 1.00

Total IPO deals
Lead underwriters
Underwriter-underwriter’s counsel,
multiple deals in the past:
Firm level
955
3.3
3.00
1 year
Lawyer level
412
2.60 2.00
2 years Firm level
1,135
3.89 3.00
1,231
4.24 3.00
3 years Firm level
Lawyer level
580
2.91 2.00
Underwriter-Issuer’s Counsel
multiple deals in the past:
Firm level
450
3.04 2.00
1 year
Lawyer level
99
2.10 2.00
2 years Firm level
564
3.29 2.00
632
3.39 2.00
3 years Firm level
Lawyer level
161
2.17 2.00
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer
Counsel multiple deals in the past:
Firm level
493
4.53 3.00
1 year
Lawyer level
20
2.00 2.00
2 years Firm level
582
5.51 3.00
639
6.18 4.00
3 years Firm level
Lawyer level
30
2.00 2.00
Underwriter-Issuer’s Counsel multiple
“conflict” deals in the past 1 year:
Firm level
406
2.31 2.00
Lawyer level
111
2.47 2.00
IPO first day price increase
(percent)
2,265
0.28 0.11
Company ages (years)
2,265 12.80 7.00
Time to completion (days)
2,265 115.18 88.00

Min

Max

Standard
Deviation

1.00

7.00

0.82

2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00

13.00
9.00
16.00
19.00
13.00

1.95
1.14
2.63
3.07
1.57

2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00

13.00
3.00
16.00
18.00
5.00

1.87
0.30
2.33
2.48
0.45

2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00

18.00
2.00
27.00
31.00
2.00

3.41
0.00
4.90
6.17
0.00

1.00
1.00

13.00
11.00

2.15
2.16

-0.75
6.97
>1.00 157.00
1.00 1016.00

0.59
18.21
93.83

* A number of deals involve more than one lead underwriter, which creates more
observations than deals. Observations are de-weighted accordingly to account for this.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1. OPENING DAY PERFORMANCE AND REPEATED
INTERACTIONS.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel A1: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – firm level
Deals together in
past year

0.051***
(0.010)

0.031*
(0.012)

Deals together in
past 2 years

0.036***
(0.007)

0.019*
(0.008)

Deals together in
past 3 years
Log Gross Proceeds

0.029***
(0.006)

0.015*
(0.007)

0.067*** 0.074*** 0.092*** 0.078*** 0.093*** 0.078***
(0.012)
(0.017)
(0.013)
(0.018)
(0.014)
(0.018)

Adj. R2

0.210

0.268

0.197

0.266

0.195

0.261

Number of Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

0.097**
(0.026)

0.077**
(0.021)

0.056***
(0.014)

0.037*
(0.015)

Panel A2: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in
past year

0.140*** 0.112***
(0.033)
(0.034)

Deals together in
past 3 years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.092*** 0.073*** 0.093*** 0.076***
(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.013)
(0.016)

Adj. R2

0.212

0.275

0.211

0.274

Number of Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

0.066***
(0.016)

0.048**
(0.017)

Panel B1: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel
Deals together in
past year

0.082***
(0.022)

0.067**
(0.024)

Deals together in
past 2 years
Deals together in
past 3 years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.095*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.073*** 0.096*** 0.081***
(0.014)
(0.018)
(0.014)
(0.020)
(0.016)
(0.018)

Adj. R2

0.210

0.273

0.210

0.269

0.201

0.266

Number of Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

0.190**
(0.062)

0.128*
(0.063)

Panel B2: Lead Underwriter &
Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in
past year

0.319***
(0.095)

0.244*
(0.095)

Deals together in
past 3 years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.101*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.068***
(0.014)
(0.017)
(0.013)
(0.019)

Adj. R2

0.195

0.266

0.194

0.262

Number of Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725
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APPENDIX TABLE 1 (CONT’D). OPENING DAY PERFORMANCE AND
REPEATED INTERACTIONS.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Panel C1: Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel
Deals together in
past year

0.033***
(0.010)

0.023*
(0.010)

Deals together
in past 2 years

0.021***
(0.006)

0.014*
(0.006)

Deals together
in past 3 years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.016***
(0.005)

0.011*
(0.005)

0.086***
(0.015)

0.087**
(0.023)

0.087*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088***
(0.015)
(0.023)
(0.015)
(0.023)

Adj. R2

0.189

0.252

0.187

0.251

0.188

0.251

Number of Observations

2,265

2,265

2,265

2,265

2,265

2,265

0.517**
(0.223)

0.475*
(0.240)

X
X

X
X
X

Panel C2: Underwriters’ Counsel & Issuer’s
Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in past
year

0.690*
(0.325)

0.692*
(0.348)

Deals together in
past 3 years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.101*** 0.075*** 0.101*** 0.075***
(0.014)
(0.017)
(0.014)
(0.017)

Adj. R2

0.200

0.274

0.194

0.268

Number of Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

X
X

X
X
X

Panel D1: Lead Underwriter & Issuer’s
Counsel – Past representation (firm level)
Past representation in
the preceding year

0.144***
(0.037)

0.122**
(0.039)

Log Gross
Proceeds

0.096*** 0.075***
(0.014)
(0.017)

Adj. R2

0.194

0.266

Number of Observations

2,725

2,725

Panel D2: Lead Underwriter & Issuer’s
Counsel – Past representation (lawyer level)
Deals together in
past year

0.215**
(0.087)

0.161+
(0.094)

Log Gross
Proceeds

0.101*** 0.076***
(0.014)
(0.017)

Adj. R2

0.191

0.263

Number of Observations

2,725

2,725

IPO Year Dummies
Industry* Year Dummies
Bank Dummies

X
X

X
X
X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater
than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a
manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.

(1)

0.094
2,725

0.091
2,725

0.135
2,721

0.133
2,721

0.114***
(0.029)

0.136
2,721

0.132
2,721

0.095***
(0.026)

0.125
2,721

0.089***
(0.027)

0.131
2,721

0.133
2,720

0.145***
(0.043)

0.133
2,720

0.141***
(0.058)

0.138
2,720

0.132
2,720

0.108**
(0.035)

0.137
2,720

0.131
2,720

0.091**
(0.032)

0.134
2,720

0.105***
(0.044)

0.136
2,720

THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK

0.100
2,725

0.073***
(0.017)

0.163***
(0.038)

0.126
2,721

0.136***
(0.044)

0.135
2,721

0.041***
(0.013)

30-JUN-16

0.102
2,725

0.087***
(0.019)

0.099
2,725

0.092***
(0.026)

0.091
2,725

0.034***
(0.012)

0.049***
(0.015)

Seq: 79

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

Panel B1: Issuer’s Counsel &
Managing Underwriter – firm level
Deals together in
0.122***
past year
(0.025)
Deals together in
past 2 years
Deals together in
past 3 years

0.097
2,725

0.092
2,725

0.028***
(0.007)

0.043***
(0.012)

0.074***
(0.024)

unknown

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

Panel A2: Underwriters’ Counsel &
Managing Underwriter – lawyer level
Deals together in
0.110***
past year
(0.037)
Deals together in
past 3 years

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.033***
(0.009)

0.068***
(0.019)

(9)

2016]

Panel A1: Underwriters’ Counsel
& Managing Underwriter
Deals together in
0.044***
past year
(0.013)
Deals together in
past 2 years
Deals together in
past 3 years

Dependent Variable: Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index
30-Day
60-Day
90-Day
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
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0.100
2,725

0.100
2,725

0.352*
(0.167)

0.118
2,725

0.130
2,721

0.708*
(0.281)

0.124
2,721

0.123
2,721

0.030*
(0.012)

(5)

60-Day

0.130
2,721

0.442*
(0.203)

0.124
2,721

0.025*
(0.010)

0.140
2,721

0.387**
(0.140)

(6)

0.130
2,720

0.807
(0.643)

0.130
2,720

0.041*
(0.017)

0.141
2,720

0.761**
(0.260)

(7)

0.130
2,720

0.039**
(0.013)

(8)

90-Day

0.130
2,720

0.434
(0.438)

0.130
2,720

0.034**
(0.011)

0.140
2,720

0.405 **
(0.150)

(9)

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-JUN-16

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.118
2,725

0.038*
(0.016)

0.143
2,721

0.711**
(0.233)

(4)

Seq: 80

Panel C2: Issuer’s Counsel & Underwriter’s
counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in
0.594**
past year
(0.227)
Deals together in
past 3 years

0.112
2,725

0.013*
(0.006)

0.100
2,725

0.222**
(0.082)

(3)

unknown

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

Panel C1: Issuer’s Counsel & Underwriters’
Counsel – firm level
Deals together in
0.022*
past year
(0.009)
Deals together in
0.016*
past 2 years
(0.007)
Deals together in
past 3 years

0.100
2,725

(2)

30-Day

1308

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

Panel B2: Issuer’s Counsel &
Managing Underwriter – lawyer level
Deals together in
0. 382**
past year
(0.123)
Deals together in
past 3 years

(1)

Dependent Variable: Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index
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0.092
2,725

X
X
X

X
X
X

0.100
2,725
X
X
X

0.130
2,721

0.210
(0.139)

0.131
2,721

0.200***
(0.068)

(4)

X
X
X

(5)

60-Day

X
X
X

0.129
2,721

0.174
(0.111)

(6)

X
X
X

0.129
2,720

0.266
(0.194)

0.131
2,720

0.263***
(0.091)

(7)

X
X
X

(8)

90-Day

X
X
X

0.128
2,720

0.207
(0.145)

(9)

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The
number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the
weight of each such observation is reduced.

X
X
X

0.090
2,725

0.151*
(0.077)

(3)

unknown

Industry Dummies
IPO Year Dummies
Industry*Year Dummies

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

Panel D2: Lead Underwriter & Issuer’s
Counsel – Potential conflict – lawyer level
Deals together in
0.214*
past year
(0.097)
Deals together in
past 3 years

Adj. R2
Number of Observations

(2)

30-Day

2016]

Panel D1: Lead Underwriter & Issuer’s
Counsel – Potential conflict – firm level
Collaboration in
0.200***
the preceding year
(0.051)

(1)

Dependent Variable: Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index
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APPENDIX TABLE 3. PROBIT ANALYSIS OF UPWARD REVISION FOR
STRONG PERFORMERS.
(1)

Dependent Variable: Upward Revision
(2)
(3)
(4)
20% Bounce
30% Bounce

Panel A1: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – Firm level
Log Gross
Proceeds
Marginal Effect
(frequent collaboration)
Number of Observations

0.582***
(0.078)
0.093**
(0.037)
964

0.597***
(0.084)
0.087**
(0.037)
906

0.486***
(0.910)
0.099*
(0.044)
698

0.485***
(0.100)
0.101*
(0.044)
625

Panel A2: Lead Underwriter & Underwriters’ Counsel
– lawyer level
Log Gross
0.604***
Proceeds
(0.083)
Marginal effect
0.045*
(collaboration)
(0.037)
Number of Observations
964
Panel B1: Lead Underwriter &
Issuer’s Counsel – Firm level

0.597***
(0.084)
0.043*
(0.018)
906

0.547***
(0.103)
0.047*
(0.043)
659

0.577***
(0.108)
0.046*
(0.020)
612

Log Gross
0.594***
Proceeds
(0.079)
Marginal effect
0.008
(frequent)
(0.049)
Number of Observations
964
Panel B2: Lead Underwriter &
Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level

0.610***
(0.084)
0.005
(0.049)
906

0.501***
(0.092)
-0.030
(0.524)
698

0.501***
(0.100)
-0.274
(0.057)
625

Log Gross
Proceeds
Marginal effect
(collaboration)
Number of Observations
Panel C1: Lead Underwriters’
Issuer’s Counsel – firm level

0.620***
(0.083)
0.008
(0.055)
964
Counsel &

0.597***
(0.084)
0.024
(0.056)
906

0.547***
(0.103)
0.010
(0.060)
659

0.577***
(0.108)
0.019
(0.060)
612

0.591***
(0.079)

0.608***
(0.085)

0.498***
(0.092)

0.499***
(0.100)

Marginal effect
0.042
(frequent)
(0.033)
Number of Observations
964
Panel C2: Underwriters’ Counsel &
Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level

0.047
(0.034)
906

0.021
(0.038)
698

0.034
(0.041)
625

Log Gross
0.619***
Proceeds
(0.083)
Marginal effect
0.059
(collaboration)
(0.149)
Number of Observations
964
Panel D1: Conflict Deals – Firm level

0.643***
(0.088)
0.066
(0.145)
906

0.547***
(0.103)
0.024
(0.154)
659

0.596***
(0.109)
0.042
(0.152)
612

0.080
(0.112)
0.607***
(0.084)
0.027
(0.038)
906

-0.047
(0.122)
0.500***
(0.0922)
-0.016
(0.042)
698

-0.026
(0.127)
0.500***
(0.100)
-0.009
(0.045)
625

Log Gross
Proceeds

Frequent
Collaborator
Log Gross
Proceeds
Marginal effect
(frequent)
Number of Observations

0.100
(0.109)
0.591***
(0.079)
0.035
(0.038)
964
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APPENDIX TABLE 3 (CONT’D). PROBIT ANALYSIS OF UPWARD
REVISION FOR STRONG PERFORMERS.
Dependent Variable: Upward Revision
(2)
(3)
(4)
20% Bounce
30% Bounce
Panel D2: Conflict Deals – lawyer level
Log Gross
0.617***
0.644***
0.568***
0.601***
Proceeds
(0.083)
(0.089)
(0.105)
(0.110)
Marginal effect
0.025
0.009
-0.0002
-0.012
(collaboration)
(0.060)
(0.060)
(0.065)
(0.066)
Number of Observations
964
906
659
612
Industry Dummies
X
X
X
X
IPO Year Dummies
X
X
X
X
Industry*Year Dummies
X
X
(1)

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater
than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a
manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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APPENDIX TABLE 4. PROBIT ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF CLASS
ACTION LITIGATION.
Dependent Variable: Securities Class Action
Litigation Filed
Within 6 months of
offer date
(1)

Within 1 year of offer
date

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A1: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – firm level
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.237***
(0.057)

0.291***
(0.081)

0.254***
(0.469)

0.300***
(0.030)

Marginal Effect
(of freq. collaboration)
Number of Observations

-0.0007
(0.002)
2,639

0.0013
(0.0022)
1,645

0.0002
(0.0023)
2,705

0.0003
(0.0029)
2,138

0.225***
(0.057)

0.269***
(0.080)

0.307***
(0.049)

0.343***
(0.060)

0.003
(0.003)
2,639

0.006
(0.004)
1,645

-0.0002
(0.005)
2,705

0.0015
(0.005)
2,138

0.075
(0.050)
0.291***
(0.082)

0.107***
(0.032)
0.251***
(0.048)

0.108***
(0.032)
0.290***
(0.058)

0.005
(0.003)
1,645

0.009***
(0.003)
2,705

0.010***
(0.001)
2,138

0.269***
(0.080)

0.305***
(0.049)

0.343***
(0.060)

Panel A2: Lead Underwriter &
Underwriters’ Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross
Proceeds
Marginal Effect
(of freq. collaboration)
Number of Observations

Panel B1: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel – firm level
Deals Together in the
0.620
preceding 1 year
(0.065)
Log Gross
0.235***
Proceeds
(0.057)
Marginal Effect
(of freq. collaboration)
Number of Observations

0.003
(0.003)
2,639

Panel B2: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross
0.225***
Proceeds
(0.057)
Marginal Effect
(of collaboration)
Number of Observations

0.003
(0.003)
2,639

0.005
(0.004)
1,645

0.025
(0.005)
2,705

0.027
(0.017)
2,138

Panel C1: Lead Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel –
Deals Together in
the preceding year
Log Gross
Proceeds

firm level
-0.120*
(0.061)
0.262***
(0.073)

-0.113*
(0.057)
0.294***
(0.094)

0.002
(0.024)
0.288***
(0.057)

0.005
(0.024)
0.304***
(0.067)

Marginal Effect
(of collaboration)
Number of Observations

-0.005
(0.002)
2,201

-0.006*
(0.003)
1,404

0.0001
(0.002)
2,253

0.0005
(0.002)
1,850

0.010***
(0.004)

0.024***
(0.005)

0.027***
(0.007)

-0.003*
(0.001)
2,203

0.001
(0.009)
2,256

0.001
(0.010)
1,852

Panel C2: Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Log Gross
0.011***
Proceeds
(0.003)
Marginal Effect
(of freq. collaboration)
Number of Observations

-0.012
(0.014)
2,203

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 85

THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK

30-JUN-16

15:55

1313

APPENDIX TABLE 4 (CONT’D). PROBIT ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION.
Dependent Variable: Securities Class Action
Litigation Filed
Within 6 months of
Within 1 year of offer
offer date
date
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Panel D1: Conflict Deals – firm level
Frequent
0.111
0.084
0.335***
0.363***
Collaborator
(0.156)
(0.179)
(0.109)
(0.119)
Log Gross
0.231***
0.289***
0.238***
0.278***
Proceeds
(0.059)
(0.082)
(0.049)
(0.060)
Marginal Effect
0.005
0.005
0.029***
0.035***
(of freq. collaboration)
(0.007)
(0.011)
(0.010)
(0.013)
Number of Observations
2,639
1,645
2,705
2,138
Panel D2: Conflict Deals – lawyer level
Log Gross
0.231***
0.270***
0.393***
0.0271***
Proceeds
(0.059)
(0.082)
(0.050)
(0.006)
Marginal Effect
0.020*
0.027***
0.047***
0.044***
(frequent collaboration)
(0.059)
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.019)
Number of Observations
2,639
1,645
2,705
1,847
Industry Dummies
X
X
X
X
IPO Year Dummies
X
X
X
X
Industry*Year Dummies
X
X
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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APPENDIX TABLE 5. TIME TO COMPLETION FROM S-1 FILING.
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer
Date (in days)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Panel A1: Lead Underwriter & Underwriters’
Counsel – firm level
Deals together in
-2.523** -1.731**
the preceding 1 year
(0.819)
(0.546)
Deals Together in the
-1.815** -0.955*
preceding 2 years
(0.605)
(0.441)
Deals Together in the
-1.559**
-0.760
preceding 3 years
(0.530)
(0.393)
Log
-10.817*** -9.652*** -10.770*** -9.776*** -10.725*** -9.83***
(Gross Proceeds)
(2.776)
(1.600)
(2.798)
(1.601)
(2.785)
(1.599)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.188
2,723

0.145
2,651

0.188
2,721

0.144
2,651

Panel A2: Lead Underwriter & Underwriters’
Counsel – lawyer level
Deals Together in
-4.737*** -2.951**
the preceding 1 year
(1.450)
(1.125)
Deals Together in
the preceding 2 year
Deals Together in
the preceding 3 year
Log
-11.190*** -9.447***
(Gross Proceeds)
(2.778)
(1.596)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.187
2,723

0.188
2,721

0.144
2,651

-3.962*** -2.174**
(1.012)
(0.779)
-11.061*** -9.922***
(2.788)
(1.598)

0.144
2,651

0.188
2,723

0.145
2,651

Panel B1: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together in
-1.980
-0.718
the preceding 1 year
(1.170)
(0.820)
Deals Together in
0.238
-0.150
the preceding 2 year
(1.100)
(0.709)
Deals Together in
1.320
- 0.127
the preceding 3 year
(1.570)
(0.652)
Log
-11.536*** -10.213*** -11.724*** -10.279*** -11.915*** -10.280***
(Gross Proceeds)
(2.780)
(1.594)
(2.792)
(1.594)
(2.813)
(1.596)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.187
2,721

0.143
2,651

Panel B2: Lead Underwriter
& Issuer’s Counsel – lawyer level
Deals together in
-9.816**
-4.470
the preceding 1 year
(4.278)
(3.702)
Deals Together in
the preceding 3 year
Log
-11.544*** -10.238***
(Gross Proceeds)
(2.777)
(1.598)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.188
2,723

0.143
2,651

0.187
2,721

0.143
2,651

0.187
2,721

0.143
2,651

-4.095
-0.002
(4.401)
(3.019)
-11.600*** -10.282***
(2.779)
(1.598)
0.187
2,723

0.143
2,651
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APPENDIX TABLE 5 (CONT’D). TIME TO COMPLETION FROM S-1 FILING
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer
Date (in Days)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel C1: Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together in
-0.548
-0.011
the preceding 1 year
(0.571)
(0.500)
Deals Together in
-0.435
-0.051
the preceding 2 year
(0.422)
(0.387)
Deals Together in
the preceding 3 year
Log
-12.448*** -10.610*** -12.454*** -10.604
(Gross Proceeds)
(2.929)
(1.687)
(2.928)
(1.688)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.163
2,262

0.140
2,209

0.163
2,262

0.139
2,209

Panel C2: Underwriter Counsel & Issuer’s
Counsel – lawyer level
Deals Together in
-8.713
-5.433
the preceding 1 year
(7.492)
(6.683)
Deals Together in
the preceding 3 year
Log
-11.646*** -10.278
(Gross Proceeds)
(2.778)
(1.600)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations
Panel D1: Conflict deals
Frequent
Collaborator
Log
(Gross Proceeds)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

0.187
2,723

0.143
2,651

-0.469
(0.339)
-12.446
(2.927)

-0.118
(0.307)
-10.592
(1.686)

0.163
2,262

0.140
2,209

0.187
2,723

0.143
2,651

-1.639
-2.873
(4.625)
(2.745)
-11.684*** -10.157***
(2.580)
(1.598)
0.186
2,723

0.144
2,651

0.186
2,723

0.143
2,651

Industry Dummies
IPO Quarter Dummies
Industry Dummies*
IPO QuarterDummies

X
X
X

X
X
X

All deals

X

Deal length < 365 days

(6)

-7.771
-1.866
(9.019)
(8.222)
-11.641*** -10.293***
(2.778)
(1.600)

Panel D2: Conflict deals – lawyer level
Deals Together in the
6.00
-3.793
preceding 1 year
(10.870)
(4.358)
Deals Together in
the preceding 3 year
Log
-12.336*** -10.210***
(Gross Proceeds)
(2.593)
(1.606)
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

(5)

4.535
-3.223
(8.409)
(4.101)
-12.318*** -10.209***
(2.588)
(1.609)

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

0.186
2,723

0.143
2,651

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt

1316

unknown

Seq: 88

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-JUN-16

15:55

[Vol. 101:1229

APPENDIX TABLE 7. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS - OPENING DAY
PRICE INCREASE OUTCOME VARIABLE.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1)

(1)

Preferred Estimate – with standard controls (Standard errors)
Calibrating for quality of lead underwriter – measured by number of
deals
(2) Limiting Sample to biggest lead
underwriters: more than 40 IPO
deals
(3) Limiting Sample to biggest lead
underwriters: more than 80 IPO
deals
Calibrating for quality of lead underwriter – measured dollar marketshare
(4) Controlling for lead underwriter
dollar market share for IPOs in
preceding year
Calibrating for law firm experience –
measured by number of deals done
(5) Controlling for number of IPOs
done by law firm in the past 1
year
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs
done in the past 2 years
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs
done in the past 3 years
(8) Excluding Wilson Sonsini (outlier firm in number of deals; n
= 384)
Calibrating for lead underwriters’
use of “favorite” law firms
(9) Removing lead underwriters’
most frequently used law firm
in the dataset
(10) Removing anecdotally reported
“favorite” law firm-bank relationships
Calibrating for availability of information about the issuer / issuer risk
(11) Controlling for the age of the issuer in number of years since
founding
(12) Controlling for the age of the issuer in the log of the number of
years since founding
(13) Controlling for the presence of
venture capital investors prior
to IPO
Altering year control categories
(14) IPO quarter instead of year
(15) Removing the year 1999
(16) Removing the year 2000

(2)

(3)

(4)

Issuer’s
counsel
Underwriter’s
recently
counsel and
represented
Issuer’s
Underwriter
counsel:
in IPOs: Deals
Deals in the
in the last 1
last 1 year
year

UnderwriterUnderwriter’s
counsel:
Deals in the
last 1 year

UnderwriterIssuer’s
counsel:
Deals in the
last 1 year

0.049***
(0.011)

0.089***
(0.023)

0.021**
(0.007)

0.156***
(0.037)

0.029*
(0.013)

0.077***
(0.025)

0.029**
(0.012)

0.165***
(0.048)

0.041*
(0.018)

0.075***
(0.028)

0.031
(0.017)

0.230***
(0.06)

0.044***
(0.011)

0.084***
(0.024)

0.033***
(0.010)

0.160***
(0.042)

0.048***
(0.011)

0.085***
(0.023)

0.027**
(0.011)

0.150***
(0.038)

0.049***
(0.011)
0.049***
(0.012)
0.049***
(0.011)

0.087***
(0.023)
0.087***
(0.023)
0.082***
(0.030)

0.029***
(0.010)
0.029***
(0.010)
0.035***
(0.012)

0.151***
(0.039)
0.151***
(0.038)
0.100***
(0.038)

0.072***
(0.019)

0.095***
(0.028)

0.031***
(0.011)

0.173***
(0.044)

0.053***
(0.012)

0.090***
(0.026)

0.033***
(0.009)

0.146**
(0.040)

0.049***
(0.011)

0.088***
(0.023)

0.031***
(0.009)

0.160***
(0.039)

0.048***
(0.011)

0.086***
(0.023)

0.030***
(0.009)

0.157***
(0.039)

0.047***
(0.011)

0.086***
(0.023)

0.030***
(0.009)

0.151***
(0.038)

0.048***
(0.011)
0.039***
(0.011)
0.037***
(0.011)

0.086***
(0.023)
0.048***
(0.014)
0.129***
(0.039)

0.031***
(0.010)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.033***
(0.013)

0.167***
(0.040)
0.110***
(0.030)
0.110***
(0.038)

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN501.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 89

30-JUN-16

THE AGENCY COSTS OF TEAMWORK

15:55

1317

APPENDIX TABLE 8. ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS FOR CLASS
ACTION OUTCOME VARIABLE.
Dependent Variable: Probability of class action
litigation within 1 year
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Issuer’s
counsel
Underwriter’s
recently
Underwriter- Underwriter- counsel and represented
Underwriter’s
Issuer’s
Issuer’s
Underwriter
counsel:
counsel:
counsel:
in IPOs: Deals
Deals in the Deals in the Deals in the in the last 1
last 1 year
last 1 year
last 1 year
year
(1)

Preferred Estimate – with
standard controls (Standard
errors)
Calibrating for quality of lead
underwriter – measured by number of
deals
(2) Limiting Sample to biggest lead
underwriters: more than 40 IPO
deals
(3) Limiting Sample to biggest lead
underwriters: more than 80 IPO
deals
Calibrating for quality of lead
underwriter – measured dollar
marketshare
(4) Controlling for lead underwriter
dollar market share for IPOs in
preceding year
Calibrating for law firm experience –
measured by number of deals done
(5) Controlling for number of IPOs
done by law firm in the past 1
year
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs
done in the past 2 years
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs
done in the past 3 years
(8) Fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini
(outlier firm in number of deals;
n = 384)
Calibrating for lead underwriters’ use
of “favorite” law firms
(9) Removing lead underwriters’
most frequently used law firm in
the dataset
(10) Removing anecdotally reported
“favorite” law firm-bank
relationships
Calibrating for availability of
information about the issuer / issuer
risk
(11) Controlling for the age of the
issuer in number of years since
founding
(12) Controlling for the age of the
issuer in the log of the number of
years since founding
(13) Controlling for the presence of
venture capital investors prior to
IPO
Altering year controls
(14) IPO quarter instead of year
(15) Removing the year 1999
(16) Removing the year 2000

0.0003
(0.0029)

0.010***
(0.001)

0.0005
(0.002)

0.035***
(0.013)

0.002
(0.004)

0.014***
(0.005)

0.001
(0.003)

0.046***
(0.017)

0.005
(0.005)

0.016***
(0.005)

0.007
(0.004)

0.047***
(0.023)

0.001
(0.003)

0.013***
(0.004)

0.0002
(0.003)

0.040***
(0.015)

-0.001
(0.003)

0.010***
(0.002)

-0.0006
(0.002)

0.034**
(0.014)

-0.002
(0.003)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.0001
(0.003)

0.010***
(0.003)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.011**
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.002)
-0.0004
(0.002)

0.034***
(0.012)
0.034***
(0.015)
0.033***
(0.012)

0.005
(0.005)

0.011**
(0.004)

0. 001
(0.003)

0.044***
(0.015)

-0.001
(0.003)

0.010**
(0.006)

0.001
(0.002)

0.040***
(0.015)

0.001
(0.003)

0.010***
(0.002)

0.0002
(0.002)

0.036***
(0.012)

0.001
(0.003)

0.010***
(0.003)

0.0002
(0.002)

0.036***
(0.014)

0.0005
(0.003)

0.010***
(0.004)

0.0006
(0.002)

0.036***
(0.009)

-0.002
(0.005)
0.001
(0.004)
0.0003
(0.003)

0.017***
(0.005)
0.015***
(0.005)
0.006
(0.005)

0.004
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.004)

0.068***
(0.014)
0.046***
(0.013)
0.026**
(0.012)
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APPENDIX TABLE 9. LIMITING TO IPOS MANAGED BY LARGEST
BANKS – UNDERWRITER & UNDERWRITER’S COUNSEL.
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
Deals together in past
year
Deals together in past
2 years
Deals together in past
3 years
Log
(Gross Proceeds)

(1)

(2)

0.029*
(0.013)

0.041*
(0.018)

(3)

(4)

0.019*
(0.008)

0.026*
(0.011)

0.049*
(0.019)

0.056**
(0.0212)

0.0487*
(0.0192)

0.055**
(0.0210)

Industry Dummies
IPO Year Dummies
Industry* Year Dummies
Bank Dummies

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

Manager>=40
Manager>=80

X

X
X

(5)

(6)

0.013*
0.019*
(0.0064) (0.008)
0.0485* 0.056**
(0.0191) (0.0211)
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

X

Adj. R2

0.328

0.325

0.328

0.322

0.326

0.321

Number of Observations

1,534

940

1,534

940

1,534

940

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases.

APPENDIX TABLE 10. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – UNDERWRITER &
UNDERWRITER’S COUNSEL
Deals together in
past year
Deals together in
past 2 years
Deals together in
past 3 years
Industry Dummies
IPO Year Dummies
Industry* Year Dummies
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

(1)
0.309***
(0.057)

(2)

(3)

0.200***
(0.040)

X
X
X
0.166
2,247

X
X
X
0.166
2,247

0.150***
(0.035)
X
X
X
0.164
2,247
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APPENDIX TABLE 11. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – UNDERWRITER’S
COUNSEL & ISSUER’S COUNSEL

Deals together in
past 1 year
Deals together in
past 2 years
Deals together in
past 3 years
Industry Dummies
IPO Year Dummies
Industry* Year Dummies
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

Dependent Variable: Proportion of
Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.190***
(0.043)
0.173***
(0.031)
0.151***
(0.024)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
0.163
0.168
0.171
2,247
2,247
2,247

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases.

APPENDIX TABLE 12. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – UNDERWRITER &
ISSUER’S COUNSEL

Deals together in
past 1 year
Deals together in
past 2 years
Deals together in
past 3 years
Industry Dummies
IPO Year Dummies
Industry* Year Dummies
Adj. R2
Number of Observations

Dependent Variable: Proportion of
Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.437***
(0.077)
0.342***
(0.062)
0.321***
(0.054)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
0.165
0.166
0.167
2,247
2,247
2,247

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically
significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level respectively. The number of observations is greater than
the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being a manager in
such cases.
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APPENDIX TABLE 13. NEGATIVE DISCLOSURE – ISSUER’S COUNSEL
WITH RECENT EXPERIENCE AS UNDERWRITER’S COUNSEL
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Prospectus
Devoted to Risk Factors
Deals together in
1.281***
past 1 year
(0.242)
Industry Dummies
X
IPO Year Dummies
X
Industry* Year Dummies
X
Adj. R2
0.165
Number of Observations
2,247
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *,
**, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of
IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as being
a manager in such cases.

